Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

The State of Utah, Plaintiff/ Appellee, vs. Oston Shiloh Fairbourn,
Defendants/ Appellant;
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v Fairbourn, No. 20141149 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3699

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 2Q141149-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

O STON SHILOH FAIRBOURN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from a conviction for attempted aggravated murder, a
first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Vernice Trease presiding
WILLIAM M. HAINS (13724)

CRAIG L. PANKRATZ
DAVID M. c'bRBETT
CORBET-:C & PANKRATZ, PLLC
75 E. Fort Union Blvd., Suite 145
Midvale, UT 84047

Counsel for Appellant

Assistan t Solicitor General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 61h Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
STEPHEN L. NELSON
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
Counsel for Appellee
FIL-:C:-D
UTAH AP?ELLAH: co0:=t1S

AU1:1. \J S L(l\f:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-----

Case No. 20141149-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

OSTON SHILOH FAIRBOURN,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from a conviction for attempted aggravated murder, a
first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Vernice Trease presiding
WILLIAM M. HAINS

CRAIG L. PANKRATZ
DAVID M. CORBETT
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC

(13724)

Assistant Solicitor General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
STEPHEN L. NELSON

75 E. Fort Union Blvd., Suite 145
Midvale, UT 84047

Salt Lake District Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................................. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES ...................... 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 5
A. Summary of facts ........................................................................................ 5
B. Summary of proceedings .......................................................................... 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................
10
.
'

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 15

I.

The prosecutor did not commit misconduct because Fairbourn
was not silent in his hospital interview, prosecutors may ask
vic~ims about their state of mind to establish their credibility as
witnesses, and the prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn whether
oth~r witnesses were lying............................................................................ 15
A. The prosecutor did not impeach Fairbourn's trial testimony
with Fairbou1n' s post-Miranda-warning silence because
· Fairbourn did not remain silent. ............................................................ 16
1. Background Facts ................................................................................. 17
2. Fairbourn' s Doyle claiin is unpreserved because Fairbourn
did not object to the prosecutor's cross-examination about
Fairbourn' s hospital interview and objected to the
prosecutor's argument about the interview on grounds
other than Doyle . ................................................................................ 21
3. The prosecutor did not plainly violate the Doyle
proscription against using post-Miranda siience to impeach

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
--i- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exculpa'tory trial testimony because Fairbourn did not
remain silent........................................................................................ 25
B. Because the officer's thoughts just before and when he shot
Fairbourn supported the credibility and plausibility of his
account, the ·prosecutor properly elicited and argtled the
officer's testimony about them.. ·............................................................. 31
1. Background Facts ................................................................................. 32
2. The prosecutor's questions and comments were proper,
regardless of this Court's ultimate determination about the
adm.issibility of the evidence .................................................... ~ ........ 34
a. The testimony and argum.ent about the police officer's
state of mind did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies
because it was used to establish the credibility and
pla~s!bility of the officer'_s testimony ....................................... 34
b. Prosecutorial misconduct may not be established by
relying on alleged violations of the Rules of Evidence
that were not raised at triFll. ....................................................... 39
C. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn-to comment on other
witnesses' veracity; rather, he properly asked Fairbourn to
clarify discrepancies in the evidence .................................................... .41
1. Background Facts ...... ~._. .......... ~'.-............ :.. ············ ................................. 42
2. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn to comment on other·
witnesses' credibility, and certainly did not plainly do so ......... .43
D. Fairbour·n cannot show prejudice on his misconduct claims ............ .45
II. Officer Vincent's testimony about his training that an armed
person within 21 feet of an officer can strike him before the officer
can draw his gun explained the officer's reason for shooting
Fairbourn. The· scientific accuracy of the rule was not material,
and the trial court did not plainly err by allowing the testimony
without expert testimony on the 21-foot rule's scientific validity ........... 53
A. Background Facts .............•;.......... :·;.; ............................... :......................... 53

-ii-Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B. Fairbourn waived any objection that the testimony was
improper expert testimony frmn a lay witness .................................... 55
.

.

C. Even if Faµ-bourn did nqt waive his obj~ction, an expert is not
needed to· establish whether a police officer was instructed on
the 21-fo<;:>t rule ........................ •.•• ............................................................... 59
D. The police officer's state of mmd was relevant to providing
context for the State's case ....................................................................... 61 ·
E. Fairbourn was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's brief
reference to the 21-foot rule, even when viewed cumulatively
with the other-alleged errors .................. :.~ ........ ;... ~ ............................... : 65
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 66
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 67
ADDENDA
Addendum A: Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403
Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment, & Com1nitment (R241-42)
Addendum C: Excerpt from Testimony about Fairbourn's Hospital
Interview (R264:26, 73-75,86_-88)
Addendum D: Excerpt fro1n Argument about Fairbourn's Hospital
Interview (R264:102-06,111,116-18,131 ~35)
Addendum E: Excerpt from Testimony & Argument about Officer
Vincent's State of Mind (R263:107-08;R264:94,96-98,127)
Addendum F:

Excerpt from Testimony about Discrepancies in
Witnesses' Testin10nies (R264:71-72)

Addendum G: Excerpt from Argument & Testimony about the 21-foot
Rule (R263:111-13,121-32)

-illDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) ................................................... 24, 26, 28
Bergliuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) .......................................................... 27
VP

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ............................................................ 45
Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977) .................................................. 27
~

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ............................................................. 45
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) ..................................................... .40
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) ....................................................... 15, 23, 24, 26
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) ................................................................... 40
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) .................................................... 23, 26, 28, 31
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ........................................................... 16, 23, 28
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ......................................................................... 24
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) ................................................... 26, 28, 31
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) ..................................................... 62
Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1985) ............................................... 27
l!\fainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) ................................................ 26, 28
STATE CASES

Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903 ....................... _......................................... 30
'<JP

In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 ............................................................. .40
Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, 358 P.3d 1067 ........................................... 49
State v Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ....................................... 47

~

State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 ................................... 28, 29, 35, 51, 64

@

-iv-Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989) ...................................................... .- ...... 62
.State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 361 P.3d 104 ............. ~ ............................................ 16, 45

~

State V; Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. ·App. 1993)'..... ;.~ ......................... 22, 24, 25
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ....................... ~ ...............·... so,· 51
State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, 309 P.3d 1160 .............................................. 51
State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, 322 P.3d 761 ...................................................... 49
State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, 311 P.3d 538 ....................................... 24, 43, 44
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276 ................................................................. 31
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) .......................................... 16, 46, 51, 65
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) ..................................................... 43, 51
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) .......................................................... 28
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ................................... 28, 30
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 ....................................................... 55, 57

State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, 354 P.3d 791 ............................. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) ......................................................... 21
State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,345 P.3d 1195 ............................................................... 3
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 ................................................................ 3, 45
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) ..................................................... 21, 22
State v. lviaas, 1999 UT App 325, 991 P.2d 1108 .................................................. 28
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 299 P.3d 892 .................................................... 45, 51
State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215,335 P.3d 900 ....................................... 41, 62
State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, 365 P.3d 699 ............................................................. 57
State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, 318 P.3d 238 ............................................... 22

.,,v- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, 282 P.3d 985 ...................... _..................................... 55, 57
State v. Morgan, 813.P.2d 1207 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ......................................... 62
State v. Morrison,. 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah Ct ·App. 1997) ................................. 50, 51
State v. Moyer, 2014 UT App 7, ~1~ P.3d J182 .......................... ~ .......................... 46
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645 ............................................................ 50
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) .............................................. .4, 55, 57
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624 ................................................................. 4
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 114 P.3d 551 ............................................................. 21
State v. R.arnirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) ............................................................. 5
State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, 349 P.3d 712 ............................................................... 61
State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ............................................. 51
State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, 147 P.3d 1176 ...................................... 4, 59, 60
State v. Saenz, 2016 UT App 69, 370 P.3d 1278 ................................................... 51
State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 318 P.3d 1221 ................................ 43, 44, 51
~

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) ......................................................... 5
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) ............................................... 15, 29, 51
State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 173 P.3d 170 ............................................... 39, 51
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) ................................................................ 51
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) ............................................................. 38

v,

State v. Velarde, 675 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1984) .................................................... 27, 28
I

State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, 296 P.3d 673 ........................................................ 61, 63
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 128 P.3d 1171 .......................................................... 22
~

vj

State v. vViswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) .......................................................... .48

-VIDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397 ........................................................ 21
Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, 7~ P.3d 635 ............................................... 56
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-202 (West 2015) ......................................................... 8, 36
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103 (West Supp. 2015) ................................................. 1
FEDERA.L RULES

·. Federal R. Evid. :404 .............................. :................................................................ 40
STATE RULES

Utah R. App. P. 24 ................................................................................................. 67
u·tah R. App. P. 27 ................................................................................................. 67
Utah R.. Evid. 401 .......................................................................................... 5, 22, 61
Utah R. Evid. 402 .................................................................................... 5, 22, 61, 39
Utah R. Evid. 403 ............................................................................................. passin1
Utah R. Evid. 702 .................................................................................................... 22

-vii-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 20141149-CA
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

OSTON SHILOH FAIRBOURN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals front. a ~onviction for attempted aggravated
murder, a first degree felony. This C~urt has jttrisdiction under Utah Code
section 78A-4-103(2)G) (pour-over jurisdiction).

INTRODUCTION
Oston Shiloh Fairbourn and Officer Vincent squared off in the middle
of a street, Fairbourn holding a knife with a 7-inch blade, and Officer
Vincent holding a gun. Fairbourn said, "[You're] about to fucking die." The
two moved slowly down the, s~eet fo_r a few m~1nent~, tracking each other's
movements. Fa~bourn eventually shifted his knife frmn a forward grip to a
;reverse grip
and.
lunged. at Officer Vincent. Officer Vincent shot. Fairbourn
.
..
'

·,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

three __ times,. stopping but not_ ½ill~g :·him. Fairbourn was convicted of
atte~p~e? aggrava:~ed murder.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue

.l:

Prosecutorial

Misconduct.

Investigators

approached

Fairbourn in the hospital and read him his Miranda rights. Fairbourn said he
wanted to talk to his attorney, but then he began to "talk and talk and talk
and talk" to the investigators for several minutes. Fairbourn discussed how
he felt and what he thought when he arrived at the hospital, but the
sub~tance of what he said is otherwise absent from the record on _appeal.
Wh~l) Fairbourn ~~stified in his defense at trial, the prosecutor asked him
why he had not told the _investigators the version of events to which he
testified at trial-that he was silnply showing Officer Vincent that he had a
•

•

•

:

~

•

J

; •

•

•

knife,
and that he .stepped forward in an. attempt to
. . .
. surrender.
.

.

' •

:

The proseet~tor also asked Officer Vincen~ what ~as going th!ough
his mind when he squared off with Fairpourn. Officer Vincent tes~ified that
his thoughts shifted to his family, who dependec:1 on hhn, and that he went
into survival mode, focusing on "making it h01n_e at the end of the night."
T!1e prosecutor referred obliquely to ~his testim?ny iJ:1 closing argum.ent,
~ta ting briepy that Officer Vincent was concerne~ he was_ going to die.

-2-
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Finally, noting the differences in testimony presented by Fairbourn
and other eyewitnesses, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn if the differences
were "just a n1isunderstanding" on the part of the other witnesses.
Fairbourn responded. by explaining that there could be other explanations
for differences in testimony, such as the eyewitnesses' different vantage
points.
Was it obviously improper and prejudicial for the prosecutor to (1)
ask Fairbourn why he did not tell his story to investigators then refer
briefly to that omission in closing argument, (2) adduce and briefly argue
evidence about what Officer Vincent was thinking during the incident, or
(3) highlight discrepancies between Fairbourn's testimony and the

testimony of several eyewitnesses?

Standard of Review. Preserved prosecutorial misconduct claim.s are
reviewed for abuse of discretion, but unpreserved claims are reviewed for
plain error. State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 13, 345 P.3d 1195 (unpreserved); State
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ii22, 999 P.2d 7 (preserved).

Issue II: Admissibility. Officer Vincent testified that in police officer
training, he was taught that a knife-wielding assailant within a 21-foot
r~dius of a polic_e officer could successfully attack before the officer is able
•

••I

•,

.

(

•

to fh~e a gun. Defense counsel _had objected based on relevance and the need

-3-
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for expert testimo_ny but withdrew his ~xpert-testimony _objection after the
prosec1:1tor _and_ witness agreed- at defense counsel's suggestion- to limit
the_ testimony to what Officer Vincent was taught and not address the
•

'

•

•

·•,

•:

•'

•

T

scientific accuracy of the 21-foot rule.
Was the police officer's lay testi_mony about what he was told in
police officer training admissible to provide context for the State's case?
~--

Standard of Review. To the extent Fairbourn waived his objection or
invited any error, his claims are unreviewable. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
~i

1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). Otherwise, they are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Tr~al col:lrts are given considerable latitude in determining whether to admit
or exclude testimony from both lay witnesses and experts; such rulings are
therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68,

if if 30-

31, 32~ P.3d 624. The same standard applies for reviewing a trial court's
d~termination of. whether specific testimony qualifies as lay or ~~pert
testimony. State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,I8, 147 P.3d 1176. Similarly,
trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether evidence . is

-4-
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relevant and those rulings are likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion.

State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ~32, 52 P.3d 1194. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules are reproduced in Addendum A:
•

Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted Fairbourn of attempted aggravated murder. R199.
He was sentenced to five years to life in prison. R241-42. Fairbourn alleges
prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary error during his trial.

A. Summary offacts.
Fairbourn was walking across a busy street one winter evening. The
hand signal for the crosswalk was flashing red when Fairbourn started into
the street without looking either way. This caught Officer Vincent's

1

Fairbourn suggests that admissibility rulings are reviewed for
correctness. Aplt. Br. at 10. The authority on which Fairbourn relies finds its
origins in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d. 774 (Utah 1991), where the supreme
court stated, "Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law,
and we always review questions of law under a correctness standard." Id. at
781 n.3. But the supreme court later disavmved the second half of that
declaration. It recognized that while admissibility is ultimately a question of
law, the particular standard of revie,v to be applied depends on how much
discretion the trial court is granted in deciding- the particular issue. See State
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). As noted above, trial courts are
granted significant discretion in deciding the questions here.

-5-
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attention because he thought it showed a "disregard for [Fairbourn's] own
.safety." R263:94-95.
Officer ViJ:lcei1tpulled his
.

'

"•·,

~ar into· a nearby gas station parking lot to
'

continue ·wakhmg Fairbourn. R263:95-97. When Fairbourn saw Officer
Vir1cent' s car, he entered the same park~ng lot but just stood there. R263:96.
Faitbourn faced Officer Vincent, and Officer Vincent noticed that
Fairbourn's face seemed fixated on som.ething, and his lips were moving as

if he were saying something. R263:97-99. Officer Vincent "felt that maybe
he had an issue with me." R263:102.
Fairbourn then walked into the middle of the street, stopped, and
turned to face Officer Vincent as if to goad him into contact. R263:102-03.

Officer Vincent called for a single-officer backup t~en pulled his car into the
stree~, overhea~ lights on, to block traffic. R263:104-05.
As Officer Vincent was getting o~ t of his car, Fairbourn drew a knife
with a 7-inch blade and said, "[You're] about to fucking die." R263:10506,110-11,120;SE9. Fairbourn held the ~nife in a forward grip,2 "ready to

2

A forward grip means holding the knife so the blade extends from
the hand near the thumb. In contrast, a reverse grip means holding the knife
so -the blade extends from the hand near the- little finger. See Wikipedia,
Kn~fe fight, https:/ / en.wikipedia.org/w /index.php?title=Knife_fight&oldid
=727491575 (as of June 29, 2016, 09:48 UTC).

-6-
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go," with his upper arm next to his side and his forearm pointing forward
so that his upper- and forearm formed a 90-degree angle. R263:106-07.
After callin·g for more backup, Officer Vihcent drew his gun and told
.

..

Fairboum to drop the knife. R263:107-08. He did not. R263:108. Fairbourn
began to move to the side, and Office Vincent moved parallel to him so
Fairbourn could not attack from the side. R263:32,109. One eyewimess
,,

.

described Fairbourn as moving weight from one foot to the other, "kind of
dancing around." R263:62-63. Officer Vincent continued to tell Fairbourn to
drop the knife, but Fairbourn refused. R263:110. After about thirty seconds
of walking parallel to Officer Vincent, Fairbourn turned and started to rn.ove
quickly away, with Officer Vincent following, but Fairbourn soon stopped
and turned to face Office Vincent again. R263:47-48,63,67,76,78-79,109.
Fai.rbourn stepp~d _toward Officer Vincent, who told Fairbourn to stop.
R263:113-14. Instead of stopping, Fairbourn switched his knife from a
forward grip to a reverse grip, raised_ his forea~m so his hand ~as near his
head, with the knife pointing forward, and took another step. ~263:3536,63-64,79,114-15. When Officer Vincent told him to stop again, Fairbourn

~ 7-
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"lunged" at him. R263:36-37,39-40,63-65,68,115. 3 Officer Vincent shot
Fairbourn three times, stopping but not killing him. R263:115,143;R264:8.

B. Summary of proceedings.
The State charged Fairbourn with attempted aggravated murder, the
aggravating factor being Officer Vinc~nt' s status as a law enforcement
officer. 4 Rl,110. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1)(m) (West 2015).
Fairbourn was tried before a

jury.

The State called Officer Vincent;

Officer Fife, who responded to Officer Vincent's call for back-up; Detective
Sanders, who tried to interview Fairbourn at the hospital; and five civilian
eyewitnesses.
Fairbourn testified in his own defense. In his version, he explained
that he was heading to a nearby house where he had spent the previous
night. R264:50-5L Because he was unsure where that house was, he woul_d
.

,-

~

walk a fe~.v p~ces in the gas statior:i parking lot then switch directions, trying
to ·decide whether to go to his grandmother's nearby house instead.
R264:51-54. Fairbourn then walked into the middle of the street, and after
3

Two eyewitnesses described - Fairbourn' s motion as a lunge.
Eyewitnesses also described Fairbourn' s motion as approaching" in a
forward motion," R263:24, "kind of scooting forward . . . but not really
stepping," R263:41, moving in "a fast walk," R263:80, and, as Officer
Vincent described it, as having "stepped," R263:115.
II

4

11

The State originally charged Fairbourn with four additional offenses,
but those were all dropped. Rl, 110.

--8-
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he noticed the police car pull into the street with its lights on, he turned· and
began walking down the street, away from the car. 5 R264:55-57,60. Looking
over his shoulder, Fairbourn saw Officer Vincent outside his car, with his
hand on his grin. R264:57,60-61.
Fairbourn was moving quickly., so he was having trouble keeping the
large knife in his pocket. R264:61. He took the knife out, holding it with his
right hand near his waist, and holding his baggy pants up with his left
hand. R264:61-63. Realizing he could be charged with fleeing a police
officer, Fairbourn stopped an~ turr~ed to fa.ce Officer Yincent. R264:62.
Officer Vin.cent told him to show his hands. R264:62-63. Fairbourn raised
6
his right hand until it was about shoulder height,
still holding
the knife.
.
.
.

R264:62-64. Fairbourn said he held his hand out with the knife as if he were
"surrendering." R264:64. He took two steps back then heard a gunshot and
everything went black. R264:64,71.
After deliberating for over rune hours, the jury returned. a guilty
verdict. R163,199-201. The court sentenced Fairbourn to an indeterminate
5

One of the eyewitnesses also .described Fairbourn as walking avvay
from the police car when Officer Vincent got out of the car. R263:47-48.
Officer Vincent acknowledged that F~irbourn ''-probably'' took "one or two
steps" to the side when Officer Vincent was pulling into the street, but if he
did, ".it wasn't very much." R.263:105.
6

One eyewitness who did not see the knife said that Fairbourn was
holding his hand in front of himself, palm up and open. R263:49, 52.
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term of five years to life in prison. R241-42. Fairbourn timely appealed ..
R241-42,251.

.SUMMARY OF ·ARGUM·ENT
I. Fairbourn asserts three claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he
contends that the prosecutor improperly questioned him about not telling
an investigator his exculpatory trial version of the events and improperly
•

'

f

comn1ented on that failure in closing argument. He says this violated the
rule in Doyle v. Ohio.
Fairbourn did not preserve this claim. _He objecteci only. to the
prosecutor's closing argument, and then based only on alleged burdenshifting- not based on Doyle error. Fairbourn thu._s must prove plain error to
,

.

prevail, but he cannot. Doyle protects ag_ainst the ~undamental unfairness of
breaching the in1plicit assurance in Miranda warnings that a person's silence
will not be used against him. Thus, Doyle error. cannot exist if

~

Miranda

w~r~g does not induce a defendant to remain silent. Because Fairbourn
waived his right to remain silent by talking to Detective Sanders, the
prosecutor's questions and argument were not fundamentally unfair under

D~yle. But even if Fairbourn did not ':"'aive his right to remain silent, no
Doyle error occurred because Utah courts . have h_eld that Doyle's
fundamental fairness guarantee is not violated when the prosecutor does
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not substantially use the defendant's silence or the jury would not have
. naturally and necessarily understood the prosecutor's arguments as
referring to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. Although
•

'

1

:

•

•

'

•

-•

•

the prosecutor asked several questions about Fairbourn' s hospital
interview, he referred to it only briefly in closing argument. Furthermore,
because Fairbourn actually spoke to investigators, the jury would not
naturally and necessarily have construed the argument as a comment on
silence.
Second, Fairbourn contends that the prosecutor improperly asked
Officer Vir1cent what he was thinking as he faced off against Fairbourn.
Officer Vincent responded that his t~oughts turned to survival and to his
family, and the prosecutor referred ~o Officer Vincent's fear in his. closing
argument. Fair~ourn argues th~t the questions and argument inflamed the
jury because it made them sympathetic to Officer Vincent and his family.
He al~o argue_s_ th~t the prosecutor committ~d misconduct because the
evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules
of Evidence. Fairbourn concedes that these arguments must be reviewed for
plain error.
Fairbourn cannot show plain error because prosecutors may properly
adduce evidence of and argue about a victim's state of mind when that
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victim appears as a witness at trial and the evidence and argument go to the
victim-witness's credibility or the plausibility of his story. Officer Vincent's
testimony did so here, with his mental and emotional response to the
incident establishing the plausibility of his teslim.ony that Fairbourn was
threatening to kill him. And given the caselaw approving of references to
victim-witnesses' state of mind, any error could not have been obvious.
Further,

forfeited

evidentiary

arguments

caru1ot

support

a

prosecutorial-misconduct clailn. Due process does not require prosecutors
to predict whether evidence that is not objected to will ultimately be
deemed inadmissible. Rather, absent a ruling that evidence is inadmi~sible,
.

.

prosecutors do not violate due process by bringing to the jury's attention
evidence that is admitted but later founc_l on appeal to be inadmissible.
Third, .. Fairbourn contends that the pros_ecutor improperly asked
Fairbourn to comment on other witne~ses' veracity. Fairbourn concedes that
this claim must also be reviewed for plain error.
Fairbourn cannot show plain error because the prosecutor asked
Fairbourn to n1erely clarify a discrepancy in the evidence, which is
perm~ssible. To the extent the prosecutor's g_uestion exceeded those
permissible bounds, it did not obviously do so.

-12-
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Finally, Fairbourn argues that all of the instances of prosecutorial
misconduct combined to prejudice him. His argument implicitly concedes
that no alleged error standing alone would justify reversal- with the
exception of the alleged Doyle error, for which Fairbourn makes a separate
prejudice argument. But even if this_ Court concludes that the questions and
cmnments were improper, the trial court's failure to intervene was
harmless. The trial court cautioned the jury not to base its decision on
sympathy for either party. It also cautioned the jury that different witnesses
can honestly ren1ember the same event differently- and Fairbourn' s
response to the prosecutor's question about di_screpancies in the testimony
alerted the ju;·y to that fact. Furthermore, each instance of alleged
rnisconduct was brief, the evidence against Fairbourn was strongincluding direct evidence and corroborated circumstantial evidence_-and
def~nse counsel urged the jury at length not to infer guilt from Fairbourn' s
failure to con1e . forward wit0 his story before trial. Thus,. viewed
individually and in the aggregate, th~ alleged instances of n1isconduct were
harmless.
II. Fairbourn next contends that the h·ial court erroneously admitt~d
evidence of the "21-foot rule" - that a knife-wielding assail~nt w~thin

~

2~ -

foot radius of a police officer could successfully attack before the officer is
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able to fire a gun. Fairbourn argues that the testimony required an expert
witness and was not relevant because it related to the victin1' s state of mind,
which is not an element of the charged offense.
Fairbourn waived his expert-testimony argument by suggesting a
limitation to the prosecutor's question and stating that the lin1itation would
resolve his objection. But in any event, expert testimony was not needed
.'

.

because Officer Vincent testified only to what the 21-foot rule is and the fact
that he was taught it. He did not testify to its accuracy. Furthermore, the fact
that Officer Vinc_ent was taught the 21-f~ot rule provided relevant evidence
of Officer Vincent's state of mind, _which provided context for the
circumstances surrounding the offense and explained why Officer Vincent
shot Fairbourn.
Fairbourn implicitly r-oncedes that any error on this _point is not
prejudicial without the cumulative effect of every other alleged_ error. But
•

•

•

I

~

the brief reference to the 21-foot rule does not change the prejudice analysis.
Neither party re!erred to the 21-.foot ru~e in closi~g argu1nent, and adding
Officer Vincent's two-sentence reference to the prejudice calculus does not
increase the likelihood of a more favorable result for Fairbourn.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct because
Fairbourn was not silent in his hospital interview,
prosecutors may ask victirns about their state of mind
to establish their credibility as witnesses, and the
prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn whether other
witnesses were lying.
To prove prosecutorial misconduct, Fairboum must prove both that
the prosecutor's questions ·or coinrnents were. i~prbper and. that they
prejudiced the defendant. A prosecutor may not "call to the attention of the
jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict." State v. Tillman, 75Q P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). But a
prosecutor's impropriety is prejudicial and warrants reversal only if there is
a "reasonable likelihood" of "a ·1more favorable result" absent the
impropriety. Id.
Fairbourn argues prosecutorial misconduct based on (1) an alleged
violation of the proscription in Doyl~ v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), against
in.1peaching a defendant's trial testimony with his post-Miranda-warning
silence, (2) questions and c01nn1ents about Officer Vincent's state of 1nind,
and (3) questions allegedly asking Faj.rbourn to comment on the veracity of
~ther witnesse~. Fairbourn concedes that his second and third prosecutorial
misconduct clahns areynpreserved. Aplt. Br. at 10, 19. His first cla!m is also
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unpreserved. Thus, for each prosecuforial-misconduct claim, Fairbourn
must prove obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,r,r41-46,
361 P;3d 104; State v. Dunn,850 P.2d·1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Fairbourn cannot prove that the prosecutor's questions

and

comments were improper, that any impropriety would have been obvious
to the tr!al court, _or

~a~ he

was_prejudiced by any alleged impr_o_priety.

A. The prosecutor did not impeach Fairbourn's trial
testimony with Fairbourn's post-Miranda-warning
silence because Fairbourn did not remain silent.
Fairbourn contends that the prosecutor improperly (1) asked him
why he had not told his exculpatory story to Detective Sanders when
Sanders interviewed Fairbourn at the hospital, then (2) referred to that
testimony in closing argument. Aplt. Br. at 20-23. Fairbourn argues that the
prosecutor's questioning and con1rn.ent equated ·to an improp_er a tte1npt to
"draw[] the jurors' attention to a defendant's post-arrest silence." Aplt. Br.
at 2.0. He argues that because the "prohibition on using a criminal
defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachmenf purposes" has been clear
since the Supre1ne Court's 1976 decision in Doyle, any error should have
.

.

:

.

been obvious. ~plt. Br. at 23. 7

7

A violation of Doyle can constitute trial court error or prosecutorial
misconduct. Compare Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 761-65 (1987), with id. at
765-67. ·Fairbourn alleg.es only prosecutorial misconduct.
·
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Fairbourn did not preserve his arguments. He objected only to the
prosecutor's closing argument, and he objected based only on burdenshiftin·g, not Doyle error. Thus, this claim must be rev_iewed for plain. error.
.

.

Fairbourn cannot pr_ove obvious error.
1. Background Facts
Detective Sanders interviewed Fairbourn at the hospital several
weeks after the incident. R264:26-27. Fairbourn· said he invoked his Mfranda
rights, but continued to talk- and Detective Sanders simply listened- for
about seven minutes. R264:87,133. The record is silent as to what Fairbourn
said, with one exception: Detective Sanders testified that Fairbourn said that
"when he arrived at the hospital he thought he was dead and he felt that he
was in hell." R264:26.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn, "You didn't
say anything to him about this misunderstanding of you trying to surrender
to Officer Vincent when Officer Sanders talked to you at the hospital, did
you?" R264:73. When Fairbourn said no, the prosecutor followed up: "So
today in court talking to this jury here, nine 1nonths after this happened is
the first time that we're hearing that you were trying to surrender to Officer
Vincent, right?" R264:73. Fairbourn admitted to the question, but on re-
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direct, defense counsel elicited testimony that Fairbourn was on morphine
at the time and "was real delusional." R264:75.
The prosecutor recalled Detective Sanders. Detective Sanders testified
that he first tried to interview Fairbourn twelve days after the incident, but
Fairbourn was about to go into surgery. R264:86,92. Detective Sanders said
that when he returned later and interviewed Fairboum, he "seemed a lot
more awake, aware of the surroundings," and did not appear to be
impaired. R264:86-87. The prosecutor asked again whether Fairbourn said
anything "about attempting to surrender to Officer Vincent" and asked
whether Fairbourn said anything "about having a knife" or "about having
baggy pants that he couldn't hold up." R264:88. Detective Sanders replied
that he had not. R264:88. 8
In closing, the prosecutor argued, "First of all, everything that the
defendant told you today, he had the chance to say before. When he was
talking to Officer Fife at the scene, he had an interview with Officer Sanders
after-" R264:102. At that point, defense couns~l objected. R264:102. He
argued that by asserting that Fairbourn "should have come forward with
information," the prosecutor's closing argument "shifts the burden of

8

On appeal, Fairbourn does not challenge any of the prosecutor's
questions to Detective Sanders.
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proof." R264:103. The trial court responded that burden-shifting and
commenting on Fairbourn's "prior statements" to the investigator were

"two different things." R264:103. The trial court suggested that Fairbourn's
objection really went to the latter: "I think what you are saying is ... the
defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." R264:103.
Defense counsel implicitly rejected the trial court's characterization.
R264:103. Instead of addressing Fairbourn' s right to remain silent, he

reasserted his burden-shifting claim: "He has no obligation to come forward
with evidence. And it's improper to suggest that he had .... And I think
that's what this argument suggests is he's supposed to come forward."
R264:103. The trial court rejected Fairbourn' s burden-shifting argument,

ruling that the statement was permissible because it simply referred to the
evidence and addressed whether Fairbourn's statements to the investigator
and at trial were credible and consistent. R264:105. When the prosecutor
resumed his argument before the jury, he did not return to the point.
R.264:105.

Defense counsel, however, responded at length to the prosecutor's
reference to the interview. He told jurors to use their common sense to
determine whether Fairbourn was in good enough condition to be
interviewed just days after a major surgery. R264:116-17. He argued that
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Fairbourn "doesn't have any obligation to come forward" with evidence.
R264:117. He criticized the prosecutor's implication that "because he didn't

come forward with all this _evidence[- ]his statement, his explanation of
how he got the knife, or his pants were baggy[ - ]that he must be guilty,"
emphasizing that that "isn't how our system works." R264:117. He also
pointed out that Detective Sanders never asked Fairbourn any questions
that would have elicited the statements the prosecutor was now criticizing
Fairbourn for failing to give. R264:117. Defense counsel then concluded his
attack on the prosecutor's comment:
[T]his is his day in court. This is his opportunity to tell you his
side of the story, you know. And then because he does that,
it's some sort of penalty that's supposed to apply. Are you
supposed to not believe him or have some sort of lack of
credibility? Our system does not work that way.
R264:117-18.

After the jury began deliberations, the parties continued to argue
whether referring to the hospital interview was burden-shifting. R264:13135. The prosecutor proffered that in the hospital interview, Fairbourn
"attempts to invoke his Miranda rights a couple of times and keeps talking
to the officers. The officers aren't asking him questions. They were sitting
there listening to him for seven minu t~s, talk and talk and talk and talk.
Even after l~e saf d I think I ought to have a lawyer." R264:133. The
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prosecutor stated that he had deliberately not put evidence before the jury
that Fairbourn had attempted to invoke his Miranda rights because he
recognized the impropriety of doing so. R264:133. The trial court reiterated
its ruling that the argument did not involve burden-shifting and was
permissible because it simply addressed Fairbourn' s credibility. R264:13435.
2. Fairbourn's Doyle claim is unpreserved because
Fairbourn did not object to the prosecutor's crossexamination about Fairbourn's hospital interview and
objected to the prosecutor's argument about the interview
on grounds other than Doy le.

To preserve an objection for appellate review, "[t]he issue must be
raised to a level of consciousness that allows the trial court an adequate
opportunity to address it." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ~16, 164 P.3d 397
(internal quotation marks omitted). Doing so requires the defendant to
make a "specific objection." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ~45, 114 P.3d 551. To
be specific, "the grounds for the objection must be distinctly and specifically
stated." State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989); see also State v.

Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993) ("Trial counsel must state
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection."). The specificity
requirement of the preservation rule "arises out of the trial court's need to
assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the
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context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue." State v. Winfield, 2006
UT 4, if 27, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a litigant
must also present "supporting evidence" and "relevant legal authority."

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
For example, in State v. Brown, a defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged, identifying the
specific provision that was allegedly unconstitutional and citing due
process. Id. at 360. This Court held that the defendant had not preserved,
among other issues, a due-process claim of selective enforcement. Id. at 36061. Despite the defendant's citation to due process below, the Court
explained that the defendant "did not bring to the trial court's conscious
awareness or attention" his selective-enforcement claim, because defendant
made only "mere allusion to police misconduct" and "introduced no
supporting evidence or legal authority relevant to selective prosecution." Id.
at 361. See also Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12 (holding that a challenge based
on rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, does not preserve a challenge to that
same evidence based on rule 403); State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ,147,
318 P.3d 238 (holding that a challenge based on rules 401 and 402, Utah
Rules of Evidence, does not preserve a challenge to that same evidence
based on rules 403 or 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence).
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Fairbourn did not give the trial court sufficient warning that he
thought the prosecutor violated Doyle. Fairbourn never objected to the
prosecutor's cross-examination about Fairbourn withholding, under postMiranda-warning questioning, the exculpatory explanation he gave at trial.
R264:73.

Fairbourn's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument was
insufficiently specific to preserve a Doyle claim. He did not cite Doyle or its
progeny. He did not present supporting evidence, such as a proffer of what
Fairbourn said in his hospital interview. He did not argue that the
prosecutor's arguments violated the _Doyle proscription against using post-

Miranda silence to impeach exculpatory trial testimony. He argued only that
any reference to his silence effectively shifted the burden of proof.
R264:102-05,131-35.

But a burden-shifting claim does not equate with a Doyle claim. Doyle
recognized a specific, narrow due process violation: It is "fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial"
when the government has given an implicit assurance-through Miranda
warnings-that "silence will carry no penalty." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618; accord

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07

-23-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(1982); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980). Burden-shifting does
not appear as a rationale in any Doyle decision from the United States
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals.
Burdens of proof in a criminal trial and the prohibition on using a
defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence are both dictated by the
fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process Clause. See Doyle, 426
U.S. at 618; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 364 (1970). But that common
thread does not make asserting one violation sufficient to preserve an
objection to the other. If it were sufficient, then objecting to a prosecutor's
comments based on any fundamental fairness argu1nent-for example, a
prosecutor expressing his personal opinion that the defendant was lying, see

State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ~35, 311 P.3d 538-would be sufficient to
preserve an objection that the same comments violated Doyle. But an
objection to a personal opinion about veracity would not alert the trial court
that the real complaint was using post-Miranda silence to impeach trial
testimony. See, e.g., Brown, 856 P.2d at 360-61 (concluding that reference to
due process was not sufficient to preserve every due process argmnent on
appeal).
In fact, Fairbourn implicitly told the h·ial court he was not raising a

Doyle issue. When Fairbourn objected that the comments shifted the State's
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burden to defendant, the h·ial court offered that the real objection was the
prosecutor commenting on Fairbourn's waiver of his right to remain silent.
But Fairbourn implicitly rejected the h·ial court's suggestion and instead
doubled down on his burden-shifting objection. R264:103. 9
In sum, Fairbourn did not preserve his Doyle claim. He never objected
to the prosecutor's cross-examination about Fairboum's hospital interview.
And even though he objected to the prosecutor's argument about the
interview, he not only failed to argue Doyle in support, he implicitly rejected
any Miranda-based objection in favor of his burden-shifting argument. This
Court should therefore review Fairbourn' s Doyle claims only for plain error.
3. The prosecutor did not plainly violate the Doyle
proscription against using post-Miranda silence to
impeach exculpatory trial testimony because Fairbourn
did not remain silent.

Doyle's proscription is premised on fundamental fairness: It is unfair
for the government to tell a defendant that he does not have to talk to
police, implicitly promising not to use his silence to impeach testimony he
later gives at h·ial, then turn around and do exactly that. But where, as here,

9

Even if Fairbourn' s burden-shifting argument related indirectly to
Doyle, his objection was not sufficient to preserve the arguments he now
raises on appeal. A "general objection," "oblique reference," or "mere
allusion" to an issue is not sufficient to preserve it for appeal. Brown, 856
P.2d at 361.
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the Miranda warnings do not induce silence, there is no Doyle error because
the government breached no promise.
As noted, Doyle held that when the government has given an implicit
assurance that "silence will carry no penalty," it is "fundamentally unfair
and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be
used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." 426 U.S. at
618. But because the due process violation rests on the fundamental

unfairness of breaching an implied assurance, there is no violation when a
defendant "has not been induced to remain silent." Anderson, 447 U.S. at
408; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1986) (describing

the fundamental unfairness in terms of the government "breaching the
implied assurance of the Miranda warnings"). Likewise, there is no Doyle
error when the State impeaches a defendant's h·ial testimony with pre-

Miranda-warning silence-either pre- or post-arrest. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at
606-07; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980). And "a defendant

who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been
induced to remain silent." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408. In these situations,
there is no fundamental unfairness because the government has not induced
silence through an implicit promise not to use it against the defendant.

Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606-07; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40; see also Anderson, 447
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U.S. at 408 (stating that Doyle requires "silence maintained after receipt of
governmental assurances").
Fairbourn did not remain silent. He purported to invoke his right to
an attorney, then proceeded without prompting to "talk and talk and talk
and talk" while Detective Sanders merely listened. R264:133. He therefore
waived rather than invoked his right to remain silent. See Berghuis v.

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384, 386 (2010) (holding that a defendant waives his
right to remain silent when Miranda warnings are given, defendant
understood them, and defendant engages in "course of conduct indicating
waiver" such as making uncoerced statements to police). Because he waived
his right to re1nain silent, the State broke no promise not to use his silence
against him by arguing that he withheld his exculpatory version of events
until he testified at trial. See State v. Velarde, 675 P.2d 1194, 1195-96 (Utah
1984) (per curiam) 10 (holding that Doyle does not apply when a defendant

10

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Velarde remains good
law even though Velarde ultimately obtained habeas relief in federal court.
See Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(stating, based on State's concession,· that Doyle error occurred at trial, but
deciding case based on conclusion that conceded error was not harmless).
Any dicta about Doyle error in that case does not undermine the validity of
the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bromley v. Crisp, 561
F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (stating that state courts are free to
express their differing views" on federal questions "until we are all guided
by a binding decision of the Supreme Court"). ·
11
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waives his right to remain silent "by ta~king freely with [an] officer" right
11

after hearing the Miranda admonition"). 11
And even if this Court concludes that Fairbourn did not waive his
right to remairt silent, due process prohibits only the prosecutor's
deliberate, "substantial" use of a defendant's exercise of his right to silence,
not the "mere mention" of it. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 268 (Utah 1998);

accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 'if 67, 979 P.2d 799; see also Greer, 483 U.S.
at 763-64 (explaining that "the Due Process Clause bars the use for
impeachment purposes of a defendant's postarrest silence," and concluding
there was no Doyle error because trial c_ourt did not permit such use
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the prosecutor certainly intended
to use Fairbourn' s hospital interview to impeach his testimony and asked
several questions about it. But his actual use of that interview was cut short

11

In State v. McCallie, this Court rejected the State's argument that a
defendant's unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent is a
prerequisite to Doyle error, reasoning that the Supreme Court has
"distinguished Fifth Amendment right-to-remain-silent cases from due
process comment-on-silence cases." 2016 UT App 4, ifif23-26, 369 P.3d 103,
petition for cert. pending. But even if this Court were to find a formal waiver
analysis under Miranda to be inapplicable, Supreme Court precedent is clear
that Doyle does not apply when, as here, the defendant's silence has not, in
fact, been induced. See Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 291-92; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at
606-07; Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40; accord Velarde,
675 P.2d at 1195-96; State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ,J,I4, 24, 991 P.2d 1108;
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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by defense counsel's objection during closing argument. R264:102. The
prosecutor's use, therefore, was not substantial. Thus, there was no Doyle
violation.
Furthermore, there is no Doyle error when a jury would not naturally
and necessarily construe the questions and argument as referring to the
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent rather than the consistency
of his story over time. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if 67 (finding no Doyle error
when "jury would not likely have construed this testimony as commenting
on defendant's silence"); Tillman, 750_ P.2d at 554 (applying similar rule in
related context of prosecutor making indirect comment on defendant's
failure to testify). This Court held in State v. McCallie that when dealing with
cases where a defendant makes statements to police but those statements
are treated as silence for purposes of Doyle, a lay jury will not "naturally
and necessarily" understand the prosecutor's questioning and argument to
refer to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. 2016 UT App 4,
"if29, 369 P.3d 103 (discussing natural-and-necessary-construction rule in
context of prejudice), petition for cert. pending.
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That is what happened here. 12 The jury was aware that Fairbourn
actually made statements to Detective Sanders, referring to how he felt
when he arrived at the hospital. R264:26. The jury would not have naturally
construed the references to what Fairbourn did not tell Detective Sanders as
a comment on Fairbourn's exercise of _his right to remain silent. That is
particularly true where, as here, the prosecutor did not exploit any "silence"
by extensive argument. R264:102, 106. In fact, the bulk of the prosecutor's
comment in closing argument permissibly referred to Fairbourn' s failure to
tell his side of the story before receiving Miranda warnings. The prosecutor
said, "everything that the defendant told you today, he had the chance to

12

Fairbourn does not argue that what he said to Detective Sanders is
the kind of statement that should be treated as silence under McCallie.
McCallie-which issued about a month and a half before Fairbourn filed his
opening brief-held that using statements about a defendant's involvement
in an alleged crime does not violate Doyle, but using "statements about the
suspect's involvement in the interrogation itself'' does violate Doyle because
such statements are "the equivalent of silence." 2016 UT App 4, ifif20-21.
Fairbourn does not cite McCallie and this Court should therefore not address
it. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, if 8, 194 P.3d 903. Regardless, reliance on
McCallie would be misplaced in this case given the state of the record. Aside
from one comment that fits into neither category identified by McCallieFairbourn' s statement that he "thought he was dead and he felt that he was
in hell," R264:26-we simply do not know what Fairbourn said to Detective
Sanders, though we do know that he talked extensively for seven minutes,
R264:133. The Court cannot assess whether there was a McCallie violation on
this record. Cf Harrison, 805 P.2d at 788 & n.36 (noting record deficient to
determine whether defendant exercised right to silence for Doyle purposes,
and construing deficiency against defendant).
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say before. When he was talking to Officer fife at the scene, he had an
interview with Officer Sanders after-" R264:102. R264:15,17,19. Any
. reference to pre-Miranda-warning silence is permissible. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at
607; Jenkins, 447 _U.S. at 239-40. Thus, the statement that" everything that the
defendant told you today, he had the chance to say before" was permissible
insofar as it referred to Officer Fife. R264:102. And a lay jury would not have
naturally and necessarily construed the brief, incomplete reference to
Detective Sanders as referring to Fairbourn' s exercise of his Miranda rights.
Thus, Fairbourn has not proven Doyle error. And in light of the
foregoing precedents, any error that Fairbourn could prove would not have
been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, if 16, 95 P.3d
276 (stating that to prove obvious error, appellant must show that "law
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made").
B. Because the officer's thoughts just before and when
he shot Fairbourn supported the credibility and
plausibility of his account, the prosecutor properly
elicited and argued the officer's testimony about
them.
Fairbourn contends that "the prosecutor unfairly appealed to the
jury's sympathies, passions, and prejudice" by asking Officer Vincent what
was going through his mind during the attack, and by commenting on
Officer Vincent's "emotional" state during his closing argument. Aplt. Br. at
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24--25 (underlining omitted). Fairbourn embeds an evidentiary objection in
his prosecutorial misconduct claim: He argues that Officer· Vincent's
testimony about his "fear of dying and his family, how they depended on
him, and his need to get home to them" was irrelevant as well as
inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt. Br. at 24-25.
Fairbourn cannot show plain error. Prosecutors have considerable
latitude when arguing to the jury and are allowed to ask about a victim's
thoughts to support a victim's credibility as a witness or the plausibility of
his story. Even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, any error
would not have been obvious to the trial court in light of caselaw allowing
argument about a victim-witness's state of mind. And Fairbourn' s forfeited
evidentiary arguments cannot support a prosecutorial-misconduct claim.
1. Background Facts

When Officer Vincent testified at trial that he saw Fairbourn wielding
a knife and pointing it at him in a threatening manner, the prosecutor asked
whether Officer Vincent's "thought process" about the situation had
changed from when he was watching Fairbourn in the parking lot.
R263:107. Officer Vincent acknowledged that it had. The prosecutor then
asked, "What's personally going through your mind right now?" R263:107.
Officer Vincent responded, in part, "My thoughts immediately shift
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towards my family. I've got people that depend on me .... Like it's just pure
?urvival at that point. ... [F]or me, it's just a matter of making it home at the
end of the night at that point." R263:108.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the situation had
"upset" Officer Vincent and had "caused him pause" and a "significant
amount of concerns." R264:96-97. The prosecutor referred to Officer Fife's
testimony that he "could hear the stress in Officer Vincent's voice" when he
responded to Officer Vincent's call for backup. R264:97. The prosecutor then
contrasted Officer Vincent's agitated state with Officer Fife's testimony that
Officer Vincent was typically "a pretty calm, collected guy," "a pretty cool
cucumber, for lack· of a better word." R264:97. The prosecutor added that
after Officer Vincent shot Fairbourn, Officer Vincent's thoughts changed
"from a feeling of I'm going to die to what am I going to do to save this
person." R264:98.
In rebuttal, however, the prosecutor quoted from the jury instructions
to remind the jury not to "'let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that you may
feel towards one side or the other influence your decision in any way."'

R264:1.27. The prosecutor emphasized to the jury that "however bad you may

feel for Officer Vincent or the defendant in this case~ set those feelings aside
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and decide this case on the facts, not on those feelings." R264:127 (emphasis
added).
2. The prosecutor's questions and comments were proper,
regardless of this Court's ultimate determination about
the admissibility of the evidence.

Fajrbourn argues that the prosecutor's brief questions and argument
about Officer Vincent's state of mind were improper because they appealed
to the jurors' sympathies, the testimony was irrelevant, and the testimony
was inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt. Br. at 24-33.
The prosecutor did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies, passions, or
prejudices. And Fairbourn' s evidentiary objections cannot be a basis for a
prosecu torial-misconduct claim.
a. The testimony and argument about the police officer's
state of mind did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies
because it was used to establish the credibility and
plausibility of the officer's testimony.

The prosecutor's questions and argument regarding Officer Vincent's
state of mind were proper. A "prosecutor exceeds the bounds of propriety
by unfairly appealing to the sympathies, passions, and prejudices of the
jury." State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160~ ,I27, 354 P.3d 791 (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not prosecutorial misconduct to
encourage jurors to consider the thoughts of a victim-witness for the
purpose of establishing the credibility and plausibility of wih1ess testiinony
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as long as the questions address the victim "primarily as a witness," and are
not "designed to appeal to passion or prejudice." Id.

if if 30-31; see also

Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if if59-61.
For example, in State v. Bakalov, the supreme court held that it was
appropriate for the prosecutor to refer to testimony and reasonable
inferences about the emotional trauma a rape victim suffered and to "invite
the jury to consider this 'price' in assessing [the victim-witness's]
credibility." 1999 UT 45, if 59. The court also rejected the argument that the
prosecutor had improperly attempted to "emotionally rouse the jurors" by
asking them to "consider how they would have responded" to the situation
that the victim-witness faced. Id. 'if 61.
Similarly, in State v. Isom, this Court held that it was not improperlet alone obviously so- for the prosecutor to "ask[] the jurors 'to put
themselves in the victim's place' and 'to empathize with the [victimwitness's] alleged experience."' 2015 UT App 160, ilif24,31-32. The
prosecutor had urged the jury to put itself in the "little shoes" of the childabuse victim "and think of how you would describe the offenses that
occurred to you, how you would be able to help others understand what
you experienced." Id. ,I26. He further urged the jury, "Try to figure out
whether or not [the child] was intentionally h·ying to lie to you, really, about
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anything of significance." Id. This Court held that the argument was proper
because it simply invited the jurors to ."assess the child's credibility as a
witness." Id. if 31. Accordingly, "the invi_tation [was] not an improper appeal
to the jury to base its decision on sympathy for the victim but rather a
means of asking the jury to reconstruct the situation in order to decide
whether a witness'[s] testimony is plausible." Id. (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the prosecutor's questions and argument were qualitatively no
different than the statements condoned in Bakalov and Isom. The questions
to Officer Vincent appear to have been designed to help the jury assess
Officer Vincent's credibility as a witness and the plausibility of his story.
The State needed to prove that Fairbourn attempted to kill Officer Vincent
and that he did so intentionally or with awareness that his actions were
reasonably certain to cause that result. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1).
Officer

Vincent's

testimony

about

Fairbourn' s

explicit

threat

and

movements supported that element. And the plausibility of that testimony
was reinforced by Officer Vincent's testimony about his emotional reaction
to Fairbourn' s explicit threat and movements-it was a logical response to
Fairbourn's threatening words and actions.
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Fairbourn argues that this brief testimony would have caused the jury
to feel sympathetic to Officer Vincent and his family and vengeful to
Fairbourn because Fairbourn "almost" deprived Officer Vincent's family of
"their husband, father, and financial support." Aplt. Br. at 29. But even if the
prosecutor's questions and comments had a slight tendency to invoke the
jurors' sympathies, passions, and prejudices, the prosecutor did not
"unfairly" appeal to such emotions. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if27. The
prosecutor's questions and argument were brief, and the prosecutor used
the questions and his argument about Officer Vincent's state of mind to
establish Offic~r Vincent's credibility before the jury and provide a
satisfactory explanation of why he shot Fairbourn-not to emotionally
rouse the jury. In fact, the prosecutor explicitly urged the jury not to decide
the case based on sympathy, "however bad you may feel for Officer
Vincent." R264:127.
Thus, the prosecutor did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies,
passions, or prejudices in favor of Officer Vincent or his fa1nily. Rather, the
prosecutor merely painted a picture of events for the jury in an effort to
"reconsh·uct the situation" in a way that demonsh·ated that Officer
Vincent's testimony was "plausible." Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if31 (internal
quotation marks 01nitted). And in closing argument, the prosecutor did no
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more than refer to the evidence in the case in a way that provided context
for Officer Vincent's shooting of Fairbourn. Given the "considerable
latitude" prosecutors are given in their arguments to the jury, that use was
permissible. State v'. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,426 (Utah 1973).
Even if the prosecutor's questioning and argument was improper, it
was not obviously so. In the case of prosecutorial misconduct, proving
obvious error can be particularly difficult: "Because the line which separates
acceptable from improper advocacy is often difficult to draw, obvious error
exists only if the law was sufficiently clear or plainly settled and the
prosecutor's comments were so obviously improper that the trial court had
an opportunity to address the error.'' Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I29 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a prosecutor's
questions or arguments that "[a]t first blush" may appear to "fall squarely"
within an established prohibition are not necessarily obvious error when
viewed in context. Id. iJ30.
In light of the cases demonstrating that prosecutors may refer to a
victim-witness's state of mind in closing argument, it would not have been
obvious to the trial court that the questions and oblique references to Officer
Vincent's state of mind was somehow different.
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b. Prosecutorial misconduct may not be established by ·
relying on alleged violations of the Rules of Evidence
that were not raised at trial.
Fairbourn attempts to shoehorn unpreserved evidentiary objections
into his prosecutorial-misconduct argument. He claims that the prosecutor's
questioning and comments are improper because the testimony about
Officer Vincent's state of mind was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, in
violation of rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 25-31.
The Rules of Evidence cannot establish prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct exists only where a prosecutor argues matters not
in evidence or otherwise brings to the jury's attention matters it cannot
consider in making its decision. State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349,

if 22, 173

P.3d 170. But until a court concludes that evidence must be excluded, a jury
may consider it. By necessary extension, a prosecutor may present and
argue evidence that the trial court has not excluded because the jury may
consider it. Thus, because Fairboum did not object to the state-of-mind
testimony on relevance or unfair-prejudice grounds, the testimony was
admitted and was a fair object of argument.
In effect, Fairbourn says that the prosecutor's due process duty
extends to predicting what a court would exclude if only the defendant
objected to it. He cites no support for this remarkable contention. Rather, it
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is for the court to decide what evidence the law allows the jury to hear. And
if the court has not excluded evidence, it is not ~nfair for the prosecutor to
present and argue it.
Further, the United States Sup!eme Court has cautic~med against
expansive readings of the fundamental-fairness guarantee of the Due
Process Clause: "Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have
defined the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very
narrowly." Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). For example,
the Supreme Court has rejected a claim that the admission of evidence in
violation of rule 404(b ), Federal Rules of Evidence, rendered a trial
fundamentally unfair, see id. at 346-47, 352-54, and a claim that the
admission of irrelevant evidence rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, see

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991). The Utah Supreme Court has also
cautioned that where procedura~ rules apply, the Due Process Clause
should not be used as "a free-wheeling constitutional license for courts to
assure fairness on a case-by-case basis." In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 UT
18, 1,I 7-8. This Court should therefore hold that a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct may not be established by relying on alleged violations of the
Rules of Evidence.
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Thus, even if the evidence were irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial,
Fairbourn's prosecutorial-misconduct claim fails. 13
C. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn to comment on
other witnesses' veracity; rather, he properly asked
Fairbourn to clarify discrepancies in the evidence.
Fairbourn argues that the trial court committed obvious, prejudicial
error by failing to intervene when the prosecutor allegedly asked Fairbourn
"to comment on the veracity of other witnesses' testimony." Aplt. Br. at 33
(underlining omitted).
Fairbourn cannot show plain error. There was no impropriety
because the prosecutor merely asked Fairbourn to explain discrepancies
between his testimony and that of the other witnesses at trial and not to
comment about whether other witnesses were lying. But even if the
prosecutor's questions about the prior testimony were iinproper, that

13

Even if this Court were to disregard Fairbourn's litigation strategy
of forgoing any direct evidentiary challenge on appeal and address the
merits of his evidentiary claims as independent bases for relief, it should
conclude that Officer Vincent's state-of-mind testimony was relevant for the
same reasons the questioning was proper: The testimony made Officer
Vincent's account more plausible. See also infra Part II.D. (discussing
relevance of the 21-foot-rule). And-for the same reasons the testimony did
not unfairly appeal to the sympathies, passions, and prejudices of the juryit should conclude that Fairbourn has not overcome the presumption of
admissibility under rule 403 to demonsh·ate that Officer Vincent's.testimony
presented a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its
probative value. See, e.g., State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, if if 46-49, 335
P.3d 900 (discussing requirements of rule 403).

-41-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

impropriety would not have been obvious to the trial court because the
question here was at least arguably like ·questions this Court has found to be
permissible.
1. Background Facts
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn whether
he had heard the testimony of the eyewitnesses saying that they saw him
lunge at Officer Vincent with a knife. R264:71-72. When Fairbourn
acknowledged that he had, the prosecutor asked, "So if you were trying to
submit or surrender to the officer and these witnesses are perceiving
something else, is it your testimony

today

that this is just

a

misunderstanding on their part?" R264:72. Fairbourn responded by stating
that there may be many reasons to explain the discrepancy:
No. You know, when something happens and everyone has
different perspectives or advantage points, you know, it's not
always, you know, perceived as the other person perceives it.
R264:72. Fairbourn then proceeded to reiterate his version of events, stating

that he was simply holding the knife out to show Officer Vincent what was
in his hands. R264:72.
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2. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn to comment on
other witnesses' credibility, and certainly did not plainly
do so.

It is not misconduct for

a prosecutor to "clarify apparent

discrepancies and general confusion" among witnesses. State v. Thompson,
2014 UT App 14, ,I47, 318 P.3d 1221. While it is "improper to ask a criminal
defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness," a prosecutor
"may ask questions that seek to clarify defendant's testimony in relation to
prior testimony of another witness." Id.

if 48 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also State v. Enmzett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992); Davis, 2013
UT App 228, ,I~37-39. In Thompson, the prosecutor asked the defendant S0,
0

one of [the witness accounts] wasn't true. Which one was the truth? ... Why
don't you tell us what happened .... You think [the other witness is] wrong
about that?" 2014 UT App 14, if49. This Court held that the prosecutor's
questions were appropriate, reasoning that "the prosecutor was not
suggesting perjury or asking Thompson to comment on [another witness's]
character or motivations. Rather, the prosecutor was highlighting a
perceived discrepancy in the testimony and asking Thompson to clarify his
testimony in relation to [the other witness's] testimony." Id. if 50.
The prosecutor's phrasing in this case was even less akin to a request
to comment on veracity than the permissible questions in Thompson. The
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prosecutor here did not ask Fairbourn to identify which witness account
"wasn't the truth." He merely questioned why the witness accounts
differed, even suggesting that the evidence contradicting Fairbourn' s
account was a mere misunderstanding, not untruthful. 14 Even more clearly
here than in Thompson, the prosecutor merely asked "questions that seek to
clarify defendant's testimony in relation to prior testimony of another
witness." Id.

if48

(internal quotation marks omitted). He did not ask

Fairbourn to accuse them of lying or otherwise comment on their character
or motivations.
And Fairbourn did neither in any event. He accepted the other
witnesses' testimony as true from their perspective, plausibly explaining
that different perspectives can yield different perceptions of the same
events. R264:72.
The questions were proper because they did not put Fairbourn in the
position of having to accuse other witnesses of lying, and he did not do so.
And because they were farther from the forbidden questions than those
deemed proper in Thompson, they certainly did not plainly do so.
14

While State v. Davis could be read to prohibit questioning a
defendant about why his account differed from another witness, see 2013 UT
App 228, if ,f37-39, this Court clarified in State v. Thompson that the focus is
on whether the defendant is asked to accuse other witnesses of lying, see
2014 UT App 14, ,I,r48,50.
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D. Fairbourn cannot show prejudice on his misconduct
claims.
Fairbourn argues that the State bears the burden of disproving
prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br. at 11. However, the supreme
court recently clarified that the defendant bears the burden of proving
prejudice on unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Bond, 2015
UT 88,

iJif 41-46. 15

Fairbourn argues that the prosecutor's questions and comments
prejudiced him because (1) the trial court gave no curative instructions; (2)
the alleged misconduct was pervasive; and (3) "this was a close case," and
the alleged misconduct undermined Fairbourn' s credibility. Aplt. Br. at 2223, 36-41. Fairbourn argues that the prosecutor's questions and comments
about the hospital interview were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal
without any other error. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. But he implicitly concedes that

15

Generally, defendants bear the burden of proving prejudice even
for preserved prosecutorial-misconduct claims. See, e.g., Kohl, 2000 UT 35,
if 24. The State must prove that any misconduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt only when the misconduct interferes with an enumerated
constitutional right, such as the right against self-incrimination. See Chapnzan
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19, 24 (1967); State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if162,, 299
P.3d 892. Thus, if this Court concludes that Fairbourn preserved his Doyle
claim, the State will bear the burden of proving that any Doyle error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
629-30 (1993); McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if12. That standard does not,
however, extend to Fairbourn' s remaining claims of prosecutorial
misconduct.
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the other two instances of alleged misconduct are not sufficiently prejudicial
standing alone, because he argues prejudice only in the aggregate. See Aplt.
Br. at 35-41.
Even if the prosecutor's comments and questions were improper, any
misconduct was harmless - both individually and in the aggregate.

Cautionary Instructions. Although Fairbourn is correct that the court
gave no cautionary instructions on the alleged Doyle error, cautionary
instructions were given relevant to the other two instances of alleged
misconduct. In eval~ating prejudice, the Court looks not just at whether
curative instructions were given in the moment; rather, it looks to all
relevant jury instructions. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. Otherwise, this factor
would always favor a finding of prejudice when defense counsel fails to
object and request a curative instruction.
As to Officer Vincent's emotional reaction and concern for his family,
the trial court instructed the jury not to let bias, sympathy, or prejudice
affect the verdict. R176. And the prosecutor quoted that instruction in
closing argument, further urging the jury to decide the case on the facts,
"however bad you may feel for Officer Vincent." R264:127. Juries are
presmned to follow cautionary instructions in the absence of proof to the
contrary. State v. Moyer, 2014 UT App 7, il14, 318 P.3d 1182. The time the
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jury took to deliberate suggests that the jury did follow that instructionthat it based its decision on a careful consideration of the evidence, not
sympathy for one side or the other.
Similarly, the trial court's instructions - and Fairbourn' s response to
the prosecutor's question-cured any harm that could have come from the
prosecutor asking Fairboum whether a discrepancy in the testimony was
the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the other witnesses. The trial
court instructed the jury, "Honest people may remember the same event
differently." R183. Fairbourn's sophisticated response to the prosecutor's
question mirrored that instruction. He explained that the other witnesses
perceived the incident from different perspectives, and this, rather than
untruthfulness, accounted for the differences in their testimonies and his.
R264:72. Fairbourn then took the opportunity to reiterate his version of
events for the jury. R264:72. This Court has held that when a prosecutor
asks the defendant to comment on another witness's veracity but the
defendant's answer "alert[s] the jury that there could be conflicts in
testimony based on reasons other than that one party was lying," there is no
prejudice from the improper question. State v Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1291
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). That is exactly what happened here.
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Isolated Error. The alleg~d impropriety was not pervasive. In fact, it

was relatively isolated. The few questions about the hospital interview fall
short of the type of sustained questioning and argument that epitomizes
exploitation of a defendant's silence. Cf State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 14647 (Utah 1981) (involving repeated attempts to question witness and argue
about silence despite sustained objections and an admonition from the trial
court). And the prosecutor referred to it only briefly in closing argument. As
explained above, supra Part I.A.3., most of the prosecutor's isolated
comment in closing argument permissibly referred to Fairbourn' s failure to
tell his story to Officer Fife before receiving Miranda warnings. The direct
reference to Detective Sanders in _closing argument was fleeting,
interrupted, and incomplete. R264:102.
The two questions and Officer Vincent's answers about his state of
mind were also brief, not even filling o~e page of a 300-page trial transcript.
R263:107-08. The prosecutor's argument on this evidence was similarly
brief, filling less than one transcript page. R264:96-97, 98. Furthermore, the
argument referred only obliquely to the testimony to which Fairbourn now
objects, referring generally to Officer Vincent's emotional state and his
thought that he was going to die. R264:96-98. It was not the focus of the
prosecutor's case. And as explained, it was not likely to lead to conviction
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on an improper basis. It was geared to explaining why Officer Vincent's
account was plausible, not to make the jury convict Fairbourn because it felt
sorry for Officer Vincent or his family.
The

prosecutor's

question

about

whether

other

witnesses

misunderstood what they saw was also isolated, involving a single
question. R264:72. The prosecutor never referred to it in closing argument,
let alone suggested that Fairbourn had accused the other witnesses of lying,
which of course he had not.
Even taking all the alleged instances together, each brief set of
questions or references in closing argument did not become the focus of the
prosecutor's case and likely did not stand out in the jurors' minds or
otherwise influence the verdict. See State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if34, 322
P.3d 761 (concluding misconduct was harmless because, in part, it "was not
the focus of the prosecutor's argument").

Strength of the Evidence. This was not a close case. The evidence of
Fairbourn' s guilt was sh~ong. Generally, evidence of intent is necessarily
limited to circumstantial evidenc~. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73,
,Ill, 358 P.3d 1067. But here, the State presented direct evidence of

Fairbourn' s intent to kill Officer Vincent: Officer Vincent testified that when
he got out of his car, Fairbourn, knife in hand, said, "[You're] about to
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fucking die." R263:105-06. See State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (imply_ing that Doyle error is more likely to be harmless when
case involves direct evidence). Fairbourn, of course, denied saying this and
claimed he was not acting in a threatening manner. R264:61-64,66. This may
have been the close case that Fairbourn claims it was if the case came down
to a credibility contest between Fairbourn and Officer Vincent. See State v.

Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) · (concluding Doyle error was
prejudicial where case involved credibility contest).
But it did not. Four of the five eyewitnesses corroborated Officer
:'Jincent's testimony. And while each of those eyewitness's testimony varied
somewhat because of their different vantage points, all four saw Fairbourn
mov~g in a manner consistent with Officer Vincent's testimony that in the
final moments before the shooting, Fairbourn raised his arm, switched his
knife to a reverse grip, and advanced on Officer Vincent. R263:24,35-37,3941,63-66,68,78-80, 109,114-15. VVhile Fairbourn's actions provide only
circumstantial evidence of his intent to

kill Officer Vincent,

the

circumstantial nature of the evidence "does not diminish the probative force
of the evidence," State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 147 n.1, 326 P.3d 645 (internal
quotation marks omitted)-particularly when that circumstantial evidence
is corroborated by so many eyewitnesses, see Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297
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(implying that Doyle error is more likely to be harmless when otherwise
conflicting evidence is corroborated). 16
Defense Counsel's Response. Although Fairbourn does not address

the issue, the supreme court has held that potential prejudice from a
prosecutor's improper statements must be analyzed in the context of how
defense counsel responded at trial. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if56; Dunn, 850 P.2d
at 1225. Although defense counsel did not respond to the brief references to
Officer Vincent's state of mind or to the prosecutor's question about

16

This Court has stated that the prejudice analysis for Doyle error
considers '"whether there was overwhehning evidence of defendant's
guilt."' McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if28 (quoting Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535); see also
Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296; State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). But that rule is inconsistent with supreme court precedent. Although
it is true that overwhelming evidence of guilt will render an error harmless,
the supreme court has never adopted a rule that evidence of guilt must be
overwhelming to demonstrate harmless error. Instead, the supreme court
looks to the strength and nature of the evidence as one factor among many,
even in cases involving a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's failure to
testify at trial. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if if162, 165 (concluding that
error was harmless because, in part, evidence was overwhelming); Tillman,
750 P.2d at 555 (same); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224-25 (concluding that
prosecutor's improper comments were harmless even in the face of
somewhat weak evidence); Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786 (concluding that
prosecutor's improper cormnent was prejudicial because evidence was "not
strong"); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984) (same). This Court
has repeatedly done the same, focusing on "the strength of the evidence
supporting a defendant's guilt and the strength of the conflicting evidence."
State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, if 67, 309 P.3d 1160; accord, e.g., State v.
Saenz, 2016 UT App 69, iris n.4, 370 P.3d 1278; Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,
if83; Todd, 2007 UT App 349, if 33.
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discrepancies in the evidence, he did respond to the questions and comment
abo~t Fairbourn's hospital interview. Defense counsel elicited testimony
about Fairbourn's condition during the hospital interview and responded at
length in closing argument to the prosecutor's brief, incomplete reference to
the interview. He referred to Fairbourn' s physical and mental condition
following a major surgery. R264:116-17. He reiterated that Fairbourn
"doesn't have any obligation to come forward" with evidence and argued
that the jury could not infer guilt from Fairbourn' s failure to come forward
with an exculpatory story before trial. R264:117. He emphasized that
Detective Sanders never asked Fairbourn any questions that would have
elicited an exculpatory story. R264:117. Defense counsel ended his extended
response to the prosecutor's brief reference with an admonition to the jury
that the trial was Fairbourn's opportunity to tell an exculpatory story.
R264:117-18.
In light of defense counsel's response in closing argument; the strong,
corroborated evidence of Fairbourn' s guilt; the relatively isolated nature of
the prosecutor's questions and comments and the small role they played in
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the prosecution's case; and the trial court's cautionary insh·uctions, any
error was harmless. 17
II.

Officer Vincent's testimony about his training that an
armed person within 21 feet of an officer can strike
him before the officer can draw his gun explained the
officer's reason for shooting Fairbourn. The scientific
accuracy of the rule was not material, and the trial
court did not plainly err by allowing the testimony
without expert testimony on the 21-foot rule's
scientific validity.
Fairbourn contends that evidence about "the 21-foot rule" is
"inadmissible expert testimony." Aplt. Br. at 42-43. He also contends that
Officer Vincent's testimony about the 21-foot rule is irrelevant. Aplt. Br. at
44-45.
Fairbourn waived his expert-testimony objection at trial and cannot
now assert it on appeal. But even if he could, his argument fails because the
testimony was limited to what Officer Vincent was told to show why he felt
he needed to shoot Fairbourn. It was not offered to prove that Fairbourn
was a threat to Vincent. Its scientific validity was therefore not at issue.

A. Background Facts
At h·ial, each eyewitness, including Fairbourn and Officer Vincent,
testified about how far apart Officer Vincent and Fairbourn were. The
17

Although the heightened standard does not apply to unpreserved
Doyle claims, any Doyle error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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estimates varied. The largest estimate of the final distance was Fairbourn' s
testimony that, before he took two steps toward Officer Vincent and was
shot, he was 20 to 25 feet away. R264:71. The smallest estimates placed the
two as close as 5 feet away when Fairbourn was shot. R263:23,50; see also
R263:33-35,39,41 (describing the two as 15 feet apart when they were
squared off, before Fairbourn switched the knife to a reverse grip, but
noting that the two "became closer and closer," ending up 8 to 10 feet
apart); R263:65,68-69 (describing the two as about 10 feet apart when
Fairbourn was shot); R263:80-83 (describing the two as 8 to 10 feet apart
when Fairbourn, was shot); R263:131 (Officer Vincent testifying that
Fairbourn was 15 to 16 feet away when he shot him).
During Office Vincent's testimony, the prosecutor asked whether
there was "anything about the distance between you and the defendant that
caused you concern at this point?" R263:111. Defense counsel objected when
Officer Vincent began to refer to a rule he was taught in training. R263:111.
The trial court sustained the objection but later reversed its ruling and, after
further argument, allowed the testimony. R263:113,121-30. The prosecutor
repeated his question, and Officer Vincent responded, "When I went
through ... peace officer's standards and training, they instructed me that
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anything within 21 feet is a kill zone. Before someone could get a shot off,
they could actually get stabbed within that distance." R263:132.
B. Fairbourn waived any objection that the testimony
was improper expert testimony from a lay witness.
~

Utah courts have long held that a defendant may not seek to
challenge his conviction or sentence based on "error which was
~

affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived" below. Parsons, 781
P.2d at 1285. "To rule otherwise would permit a defendant in a criminal
case to 'invite' prejudicial error and implant it in the record as a form of
appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." Id.; see also State v. Moa,
2012 UT 28,

~ ~25-26,

282 P.3d 985 (" [T]he object of the invited error

doctrine is to discourage parties from leading the court into committing an
error and then benefitting from an objection to that error on appeal .... ");

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill, 10 P.3d 346 ("[A] defendant should not be
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 'enhanc[ing]
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that sh·ategy fails, ...
claim[ing] on appeal that the Court should reverse."' (omission and second
and third alterations in original). 18 Even when a party initially objects, he
waives that objection for purposes of appeal by consenting at trial to a

18

This issue may be viewed appropriately either in terms of waiver or
invited error.
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proposed resolution of that objection. Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237,
~17, 74 P.3d 635. In Walker, for example, the plaintiff objected to the
wording of a jury instruction but agreed to a reworded instruction to
resolve the plaintiff's concerns. Id. This Court held that Walker had waived
any objection to the modified instruction by agreeing to it. Id.
Fairbourn likewise waived his expert-witness objection. When the
prosecutor initially asked Officer Vincent whether there was anything about
the distance that concerned him, defense counsel objected as soon as Officer
Vincent began to talk about his tr_aining. R263:111. Defense counsel argued
that Officer Vincent's state of mind was not relevant to the case. R263:11113. As the parties argued the issue of relevance, defense counsel added an
objection on the basis that expert testimony was required. R263:127-29.
Outside_ the presence of the jury, the prosecutor proffered what Officer
Vincent's testimony would be, with Officer Vincent adding that "they've
done studies" to develop the 21-foot rule. R263:126. Defense counsel
reiterated his relevance objection but argued that, if the testimony was to be
admitted over his relevance objection, it should be limited to what Officer
Vincent was taught and not refer to any studies; otherwise, Fairbourn
would need to call his "own expert." R263:126-27. The prosecutor and
Officer Vincent agreed to that limitation. R263:127-28. With that agreement
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m place, defense counsel stated, "That would take care of my other
objections .... " R263:128.
The testimony was ultimately elicited and admitted consistent with
Fairbourn's proposed limitation that Officer Vincent testify only to what he
was taught and not to its scientific validity. R263:131-32.
Fairbourn thus waived his expert-witness objection by proposingnot just agreeing to- a limitation on the testimony. Fairbourn' s proposed
limitation would, of course, not operate as a waiver of his relevance
objection. But Fairbourn explicitly agreed that his proposed limitation
II

would take care of my other objections" - his only other objection being an
expert-testimony objection. R263:128. Fairbourn now argues that even the
limited testimony would have required an expert. But that limitation was
initiated by Fairbourn. See State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ,r,r17-23, 365 P.3d 699
(limiting invited error to error that was initiated by the defendant).
Fairbourn thus

II

encourage[ed] the court to proceed without further

consideration of [the] issue." Moa, 2012 UT 28, if 27. Allowing Fairbourn to
propose a limitation on the testimony to resolve an objection and then use
that same objection to obtain relief on appeal- even when the testimony
was limited as agreed-would present a classic case of planting error. See id.
,I25; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill; Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285.
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In discussing its ruling, the trial court made statements suggesting
that the testimony was admissible to show that Fairbourn was a threat.
R263:128-30.
question

o!

19

But the trial court's rationale for its ruling is irrelevant to the

whether Fairbourn waived his objection- or whether the

ultimate ruling was correct. The trial court's statements were made outside
the presence of the jury, and all that was presented to the jury was Officer
Vincent's circumscribed testimony as to what he was taught-the very thing
Fairbourn suggested and agreed would be acceptable. R263:132. Defense
counsel's final statement on the matter-that use of the 21-foot rule to show
that a person _"constitutes a threat if you are within 21 feet ... [is] in the
nature of expert testimony" -at most presents an objection to improper use
of the testimony. R263:129. But the testimony was never used in that way.
The prosecutor did not even refer to the 21-foot rule in his closing
argument. R264:94-110,127-30. In short, the testimony was admitted just as
Fairbourn agreed it could be, and he cannot now claim that his proposed
limitation was insufficient. The only issue he preserved for appeal is
whether the 21-foot rule was relevant.

19

Given other contradictory statements the trial court made,
R263:121-30, it may well have meant that it was admitting the testimony to
establish whether Officer Vincent believed Fairbourn posed a threat.
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C. Even if Fairbourn did not waive his objection, an
expert is not needed to establish whether a police
officer was instructed on the 21-foot rule.
Regardless, expert testimony was not required because the issue was
how what Officer Vincent was taught affected h_is decision to shoot
Fairbourn. That testimony is lay fact testimony, not expert testimony. Lay
fact testimony "need not satisfy rule 701 or 702," Utah Rules of Evidence,
which govern lay opinion testimony and expert testimony, respectively.

State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,I16, 147 P.3d 1176. Lay testimony is any
testimony that is "not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
know ledge." Id. 111.
Fairbourn argues that Officer Vincent's testimony was expert
testimony rather than lay testimony because it was based on specialized
knowledge, as evidenced by the fact that Officer Vincent learned about the
21-foot rule "through the extensive training he received as a police officer."
Aplt. Br. at 43. Fairbourn thus argues that the testimony was inadmissible
because the State failed to lay the appropriate foundation for expert
testitnony. Aplt. Br. at 43. Fairbourn is incorrect.
Specialized knowledge is "knowledge with which lay persons are not
fa1niliar," that is "beyond the ken of the average juror," or that is "outside
the knowledge of a civilian bystander." Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,131
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(internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, testimony is not based on
specialized knowledge if "an average bystander would be able to provide
the same testimony" or would understand the importance of the fact if they
observed it. Id. if if 33-34. If an average juror observed what the witness observed
and could attest to the same facts without "extensive training and years of
experience," then the testimony involves lay fact testimony. Id. if 36.
Testimony about the accuracy of the 21-foot rule-about the precise
distance at which a knife-wielding assailant becomes a threat-would be
beyond the ken of the average juror. But Officer Vincent testified only that
he was taught the 21-foot rule and that that was why he was concerned
about the distance between him and Fairbourn. R263:131-32. If an average
bystander sat in on Officer Vincent's training, she could have testified to the
fact that Officer Vincent was told to be wary of knife-wielding assailants
who come within 21 feet. No "extensive training" or "years of experience"
would be needed to attest to that fact or to understand its likely impact on
Officer Vincent's perception of the threat Fairbourn posed. See Rothlisberger,
2006 UT 49, if ~33, 36. The testimony was thus lay fact testimony and no
expert was required.
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D. The police officer's state of mind was relevant to
providing context for the State's case.
Fairbourn argues that the 21-foot rule is relevant only to whether a
victim "has a reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm." Aplt. Br. at 44. That
issue, he argues, arises in self-defense or excessive force cases, but it was not
relevant to the issues in this case. Aplt. Br. at 44-45. He also argues more
generally that a victim's state of mind is irrelevant because it is not an
element of attempted aggravated murder. Aplt. Br. at 26-27.
But the fact that Officer Vincent was taught the 21-foot rule was
relevant here to explain why he shot Fairbourn. And explaining why he
shot Fairbourn is relevant to the circumstances surrounding the offense and
provided critical context for the State's case.
Evidence is relevant where it "has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and where "the fact
is of consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[E]vidence
that has even the slightest probative value is relevant under the rules of
evidence." State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,

if 64, 349 P.3d 712 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
The prosecution has

~

"right to present evidence with broad

'narrative value' beyond the establishment of particular elements of a
crime," so long as it is "plausibly linked" to the charged conduct. State v.
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Verde, 2012 UT 60,

,r,r28,

29, 296 P.3d 673. "[T]he prosecutor is entitled to

paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in question
transpired," State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ),
"not just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance," Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997). Under "basic principles of narrative
relevance," evidence beyond the specific criminal thoughts and actions of
the defendant may be admissible to prove context for the events that led to
the criminal charges. State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, if 57, 335 P.3d 900
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is true even if the evidence
involves a victim's state of mind. See State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126, 1127-28
(Utah 1989) (concluding that evidence of victim's state of mind was relevant
to show why she did not report crime earlier).
Flexibility to provide evidence with broad narrative value is
necessary. If the State were prohibited from adducing any fact that did not
provide direct proof of an element of the charged offense, the State would
be unable to tell a coherent, credible story to the jury. "U]uries have
expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may
well hold the absence of that evidence against the party." Old Chief, 519 U.S.
at 188 n.9.
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Evidence that Officer Vincent was taught the 21-foot rule had
immense narrative value for the State's case, as it provided an explanation
why he shot Fairbourn three times. See Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,128. Any time a
police officer shoots a defendant, the State must be allowed to present
evidence explaining why the officer did so, even when that officer is not on
trial. Otherwise, the jury could become unfairly prejudiced against the State,
and the omission would undermine the plausibility of the State's case.
Without such an explanation, the jury may have wondered whether Officer
Vincent acted too rashly. And even though that would not have been a
defense for Fairbourn, it may have raised concerns that the State was
properly allowed to address. Such holes in the basic narrative of an ev_ent
would be exploited by defense counsel, who would argue to the jury that
the State's story does not make sense and is thus incredible. Therefore, even

if Officer Vincent's thoughts are not directly related to Fairbourn' s actions
and intent, they are still highly relevant because without them there would
be a "missing chapter[] in the prosecution's case." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Elsewhere m his brief, Fairbourn cites State v. Wauneka and its
progeny for the proposition that a victim's state of mind is not relevant
absent something that puts it at issue in the case. Aplt. Br. at 33; see State v.
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Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977). But Wauneka is inapposite. Wauneka
held that evidence of a homicide victim's state of mind is irrelevant except
when the victim's mental state is at issue at trial, such as when the
defendant contests identify or raises claims of self-defense, suicide, or
accident to which the victim contributed as an aggressor. 560 P.2d at 1380.
But Officer Vincent was not a homicide victim. He testified at trial. As
,.

discussed above, a victim's state of mind may be relevant to establishing the
credibility of that victim as a testifijing witness. See, e.g., Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,
,r,r59-61.
Even if Wauneka applied, that case recognized another exception:
evidence of a victim's state of mind is admissible when "relevant to prove
or explain her subsequent acts or conduct." 560 P.2d at 1379. For example,
in State v. Garrido, this Court concluded that a statement about a victim's

fear of the defendant was properly admitted to explain why the victim
failed to appear at trial-which clearly was not an element of the charged
offense. 2013 UT App 245, if 25, 314 P.3d 1014. The statement was also
admissible to explain an inconsistency between two of the victim's prior
statements that were admitted, because the victiln' s "credibility had become
an issue at trial." Id.
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Such is the case here. Officer Vincent's testimony that he was taught
the 21-foot rule was "relevant to prove or explain [his] subsequent acts or
conduct" - his shooting of Fairbourn. See Wauneka, 560 P.2d at 1379; Garrido
2013 UT App 245, ,I25. In other words, testimony about the 21-foot rule
provided evidence of the circumstances and context surrounding the crime
and the broader narrative of the event, which was relevant because that
evidence made the State's case more believable. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ruled that the evidence was relevant.
E. Fairbourn was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's brief
reference to the 21-foot rule, even when viewed
cumulatively with the other alleged errors.

Fairbourn implicitly concedes that admission of testimony about the
21-foot rule is not prejudicial on its own. He argues prejudice only in the
context of cumulative error. Aplt. Br. at 45-47. Fairbourn argues that the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors prejudiced him because "this was a
close case based on relatively thin evidence in which the jury struggled to
reach a verdict." Aplt. Br. at 45-47.
To prevail under the cumulative error doch·ine, Fairbourn must show
that he was prejudiced by "the cumulative effect of the several errors."
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. He cannot do so here. Because there was no
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prosecutorial misconduct and no evidentiary error, Fairbourn cannot
prevail under the cumulative error doctrine.
But even if this Court finds error on each point alleged by Fairbourn,
the cumulative effect of those errors would have been minimal. As
discussed above, the aggregate effect of each instance of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. Adding in the reference to the 21foot rule does not change that calculus. Although the parties argued about
the rule extensively outside the presence of the jury, R263:113,121-30, the
jury heard only a brief, two-sentence reference to the rule, R263:131-32.
Significantly, neither side referred to the 21-foot rule in closing argument.
R264:94-130. In light of the strong direct and circumstantial evidence that
Fairbourn intentionally attempted to kill Officer Vincent, corroborated by
four eyewitnesses, see supra Part I.D., any errors were harmless, even when
viewed in the aggregate.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
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Rule 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence"

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion Of Relevant Evidence On Grounds Of Prejudice, Confusion, Or
Waste Of Time

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
OSTON SHILOH FAIRBOURN,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Case No: 141900233 FS
Judge:
VERNICE TREASE
Date:
November 21, 2014

PRESENT
Clerk:
amyb
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s}: SHUEY, RAYMOND S
DEFEND~.NT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 30, 1989
Sheriff Office#: 311464
Audio
Tape Number:
CR W45
Tape Count: 11:52
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/18/2014 Guilty
HEARING
Counsel for the defendant moves the Court for a 402 reduction. The
State indicates that the victim will not be present to speak at
this sentencing. The Court makes a record of the defendant's
history of violence.
The State makes a record of their concerns. The defendant
addresses the Court. The Court denies the 402 reduction.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER
a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah
State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 334 day(s) previously served.
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1
2
3

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NELSON:
Q.

Detective Sanders, did you attempt to talk to the

4

defendant at the hospital after the incident that we've been

5

talking about today?

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

What did he tell you about his thoughts upon arriving

8
9

10

at the hospital?
A.

was dead and he felt that he was in hell.

MR. NELSON:

11

12

He said when he arrived at the hospital he thought he

Thank you, your Honor.

questions I have of this witness.

13

THE COURT:

Cross?

14

MR. SHUEY:

I'm sorry.

15

witness -- I apologize.

MR. NELSON:

16

17

18
19

20
21

22
23

Q.

I was talking to the last

Can I ask the question to be repeated?
I'm happy to do that, yes.

Detective Sanders, what did the defendant tell you

about how he was feeling when he arrived at the hospital?
A.

When he arrived at the hospital he said that he

thought he was dead and that he felt like he was in hell.
MR. NELSON:

Thank ycu, Judge.

That's all the

questions we have.
THE COURT:

Mr. Shuey, cross?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

24
25

That's all the

BY MR. SHUEY:
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1
2

here.

Do you remember this person?
A.

You know what, I know his name because I

3

reading the discovery,

4

interviewed me at the hospital, but I was so

5

my contacts and I was pretty on the morphine

6

7

Q.

from

I know that he was the officer that had
I didn't have

When you talk about your contacts, are you talking

about corrective lenses for your eyes?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

--

But you are aware of the fact that he came to

the hospital and talked to you,

right?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you talked to him at the hospital, right?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

You didn't say an:rthing to him about this

15

misunderstanding of you trying to surrender to Officer Vincent

16

when Officer Sanders talked to you at the hospital, did you?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

So today in court talking to this jury here,

nine

19

months after this happened is the first time that we're hearing

20

that you were trying to surrender to Officer Vincent,

right?

21

A.

Yes.

I didn't say anything to the officer.

22

Q.

I want to talk to you really quick about the shorts

23

that you said you were having a hard time pulling up.

24

your waist size?

25

A.

What's

Um, right now I'm wearing pants these pants that are

OSTON FAIRBOURN
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1

32s.
Q.

2

3

Is that about the same waist size you had on

December 15th, 2013?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Were you bigger or smaller back then?

6

A.

Um, well, I was

7
8
9

I

I was a lot smaller back then,

was wearing pants that dii not fit me at all.
Q.

What size were the pants you were wearing that day?

Or the shorts, I should say.

10

A.

I'm not sure.

11

Q.

So you don't know what size they were?

12

A.

No,

13

Q.

Okay.

14

I mean,

I couldn't be precise with the size.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Judge, that's all I have for this

Redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

16

18

I had borrowed them from a friend.

witness.

15

17

but

BY MR. SHUEY:

Q.

You indicate

that you -- or when you were at the

19

hospital, do you -- do you remember Detective Sanders coming or

20

you don't remember?

21
22

23
24

25

A.

Um, they had actually tried to make an interview the

first time -Q.

That's just a yes or no.

Did you remember him coming

to your room or not?
A.

I mean, I couldn't say I could pinpoint his face but
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1
2
3

by his name, I know it's Detective Sanders.
Okay.

Q.

So do you remember some officers coming to

your room?

4

A.

Yes, I do.

5

Q.

All right.

6

you said that you were on morphine?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Okay.

9
10

And do you have - - I think you started - -

Was that during -- do you know how long you

were on morphine when you were in the hospital?
Um, they had me on morphine, trazodone and Seroquel,

A.

11

um -- the morphine they had me on at least, I think maybe three

12

weeks.

13

pill form.

14

15
16

And then instead of injecting it, they would give me

Q.

Okay.

or anything like that?
A.

Oh, yeah.

17

delusional.

18

up and - -

19

Was that affecting your thinking -- thinking

Q.

And I also didn't have my contacts in when I woke

Okay.

And these --

20

THE COURT:

21

:MR. NELSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

It had me in a real -- I was real

~

think that's all I have.

Recross?
Nothing further, your Honor.
Okay.

Thank you.

Can I ask counsel to

approach?

24

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

25

THE COURT:

Do you h_ ~re any other witnesses?
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Q.

1

I want to talk to you very briefly about your

2

interview with the defendant.

Did you hear the defendant

3

testify that he was on morphine and -- when you came to

4

interview him?

s

A.

Yes.

6

Q,

Have you interacted with people during the course of

7

your career who are either intoxicated or under the influence

8

of drugs?

9

A.

Yes, many times.

10

Q.

Is that a common occurrence for police officers?

11

A.

To deal with people on drugs, yes.

12

Q.

When you were talking with the defendant during this

13

interview, what were your impressions about his lucidity or

14

sobriety?
A.

15

Um, I'd actually gone to the hospital to interview

16

him.

We'd gone there twice.

The first time it was not very

17

he wasn't able to answer easy or simple questions like what day

18

of the week it was, what month it was at the time.

19

Q.

Okay.

So that was the first interview?

20

A.

That was the first time on the 27th.

21

Q.

What about the secon~ time?

22

A.

The second time, yes

he seemed a lot more awake,

23

aware of the surroundings, aware that I was there and that --

24

what I was there to talk to him about.

25

Q.

So if he was aware of what you were talking to him
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1

about, was he -- did you le~ him know that there was a crime

2

being investigated?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And is this interview that you testified about

5

earlier where the defendant said that he thought he had died

6

and was in hell?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

So that second time you talked to him?

9

A.

That was the second time, yes.

10

Q.

Just want to be sure we are clear about that.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

If the defendant had given you the impression that he

13

had been under the influence of narcotics, would you have

14

attempted to interview him?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Why not?

17

A.

Well, based on my training and experience,

I

feel

18

that if someone's under the influence of narcotics, alcohol,

19

something like that, their statement or their opinions or

20

accounts of that may be impair~i so they may not be able to get

21

a correct recollection of that.

22

to them.

23

to give their opinion and what their side of what happened.

And I don't feel that's fair

I feel that they should have as much of a clear mind

24

Q.

Approximately how long did the second interview last?

25

A.

Approximately seven minutes,

I believe.
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1

2

Q.

In that interview di~ the defendant say anything to

you about attempting to surrender to Officer Vincent?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Did he say anything to you in that interview about

5

having a knife?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Did he say anything t:o you in that interview about

8

some sort of ceremonial significance or connection to Native

9

American culture with respect to that knife in that interview?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Did he say anything to you in that interview about

12

having baggy pants that he couJdn 1 t hold up?

13

A.

No, not at all.

14

Q.

Detective Sanders, have you attempted to investigate

15

or look into the origins of this knife that's in State's

16

Exhibit 31?

17

A.

I did.

18

Q.

Has your investigation yielded any connection to any

19

sort of cultural significan~e to Native Americans?

20

A.

No, not at all.

21

Q.

What has your investigation revealed about that?

22

A.

I actually did a Google search on it.

23

common - MR. SHUEY:

24
25

It 1 s a

Well, objection to what's on Google, your

Honor.
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1

you determine whether Officer Vincent was credible, whether

2

these civilian witnesses that the State brought on and put in

3

front of you were credible, whether Officer Fife was credible

4

frankly, and also whether the defense's witnesses were

5

credible, specifically the defendant in this case.

6

I want you to remember as you are thinking about the

7

defendant's testimony, things like does the witness have

8

something to gain or lose from this case?

9

have any reason to lie or set up the testimony?

Does the witness
How believable

10

was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence

11

presented at trial?

12

in light of human experience.

13

human experiences.

14

determine credibility when you listen to a witness.

How believable was the witness's testimony
All of you are human; you have

You can use those experiences to weigh and

I want to bring up three important things about the

15
16

defendant's testimony that I d like you to consider in light of

17

these elements that you've read about in these instructions.

18

First of all, everything that t~1e defendant told you today, he

19

had the chance to say before.

20

Fife at the scene, he had an interview with Officer Sanders

21

after --

22
23

1

MR. SHUEY:

When he was talking to Officer

Your Honor, I think this is shifting the

burden of proof.

24

THE COURT:

Counsel cpproach.

25

MR. SHUEY:

It's objectionable.
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1

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

2

MR. SHUEY:

I think it's improper for -- in closing

3

argument to argue that the defendant should have come forward

4

with information.

5

It shifts the burden of proof.

THE COURT:

Well, I don 1 t know that.

I think they

6

are two different things.

The burden of shifting is shifting

7

the burden at trial.

8

statements.

9

So if the question is, is he [inaudible] the defendant has to

It doesn't have anything to do with prior

We're talking about the burden of proof at trial.

10

prove an element or something at trial.

11

saying is I think the defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to

12

remain silent.
MR. SHUEY:

13

He has no obligation to come forward with

14

evidence.

15

should.

16

supposed to come forward.

17

I think what you are

And it's improper to suggest that he had.

That he

And I think that's what this argument suggests is he's

MR. NELSON:

That's absolutely untrue, your Honor.

18

He testified that everything he said in court today he was

19

saying for the first time.

20

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So --

21

MR. SHUEY:

Well, that's not what I'm talking about.

22

THE COURT:

That's why I say that burden shifting is

23

slightly different.

I think hr 1 s talking about the testimony

24

at trial was that he did not tell the officer.

25

the testimony --

I mean that was
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1

2

MR. SHUEY:

Well, the officer didn't ask him.

There's no evidence that he was asked, did you?
THE COURT:

3

[inaudible] that's what -- I don't think

4

it's burden shifting when the ~rgument is based on the evidence

5

present in the trial.

6

the defendant had some responsibility to put on certain

7

evidence.

8

he didn't say to the officer [inaudible]

9

stating what the evidence is.

I think if he were finding if -- that

But the evidence was pretty clear [inaudible]
I

that

think it's just

It's not -- it's not shifting

10

the burden to the defendant be~ause that's what the evidence

11

was.

13

It's an observation about

his credibility, your Honor.
THE COURT:

14
15

Well -- okay.

MR. NELSON:

12

I mean, it's -- there's a difference

between burden shifting.

16

MR. SHUEY:

Okay.

17

THE COURT:

And I think what you are saying,

I don't

18

think he's alleging that the defendant had to bring evidence in

19

trial.

20

defendant was interviewed, he did not say to the officer

21

He's just saying the evidence in this case is when the

MR. SHUEY:

Well, I feel like it's a burden -- a

22

shifting of the burden.

I t s a basic argument that's being

23

made is the defendant should have come forward and proven his

24

innocence before the case.

25

obligation to do that.

And I don't think that he has any

And I think that's a shifting of
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1

burden.
Can we ~ake a record of this?

2

MR. NELSON:

3

MR. SHUEY:

We just did.

4

THE COURT:

[inaudible) told you everything is

5

recorded so what I am saying [inaudible]

6

MR. SHUEY:

7

MR. NELSON:

--

Okay.
My position is that this impacts his

8

credibility directly and that if this were indeed [inaudible]

9

understanding that he says iie is, why didn I t he just tell

10

everybody that from the get-go?

11

of trial to tell the jury exactly what went on there if this is

12

really what happened?

13
14

THE COURT:

Why did he wait till the day

He told him something else.
Do you want to put anything on the

record?

"'
MR. SHUEY:

15

I thitk it's -- the defendant has no

16

obligation to come forward before trial and prove his

17

innocence.

18

is going into, it is that there is some burden on the defendant

19

and so I think it's improper.

I think implicit in this statement that the State

THE COURT:

20

So my feeling is I don't think it's

21

burden shifting.

I think the State has made -- has stated the

22

testimony.

23

of talking about his credibility and consistent or inconsistent

24

statements made.

And the evidence was this.

And it's in the context

25
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1

MR. NELSON:

Okay. t~e second thing in the

2

defendant's testimony that I would like to talk to you about,

3

ladies and gentlemen, is something I would like you to consider

4

is the defendant's statement in this story to you today that

5

this knife was some sort of cultural significance with Native

6

American and that's why it was important.

7

The evidence that you heard from Detective Standers

8

was quite the contrary.

9

buy in sets from stores.

I t s a common kitchen knife you can
Okay?

10

Third of all, I'd like you to consider the fact based

11

from your human experience, okay, this second-to-last asterisks

12

here, Instruction No. 18, how believable was the witness's

13

testimony in light of human experience?
The defendant's s·-.atement to you was, when I

14

15

ultimately decided to give up, I turned around with a knife

16

above my head and walked towards the officer and that's when I

17

was shot.

18

Think about that, ladies and gentlemen, in light of

19

your experience.

20

in very close contact with

21

armed and you know his gun is out and pointed at you.

22

This is a stressful situation where you are
1

police officer whom you know is

Why on earth would somebody turn around like that

23

with a knife above their head with the blade pointed towards

24

the officer and start moving towards the officer at that point

25

if what your intent is is to surrender and give up?
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CLOSING ARGUMENT

1

2

BY MR. SHUEY:

3
4

I 1 ve got a number of notes that I want to go over so
I'm going to move the podium if I could.
Just as some preliminary matters, um, the

5

6

statements that are made by counsel, whether it's myself or

7

Mr. Nelson, are not evidence.

8

at any time ever intentionally misrepresent facts.

9

try to do that.

10

I don't believe Mr. Nelson would
I wouldn't

It's very ~ossible that we heard -- that we

wrote down different things about witnesses.

11

I'm sure when you get into the jury room, there will

12

be arguments among yourself about what witnesses just today or

13

yesterday said.

14

witnesses.

And certainly there's differences between the

15

And a little bit ;ontrary to what Mr. Nelson said, I

16

think that this case sort of demonstrates that while there's a

17

lot of consistencies and general sort of pattern of movements

18

and things, there is big differences as far as number of feet

19

away when certain things happened and so forth.

20

in some ways demonstrates how different people can see things

21

or remember things differently.

22

So this case

But the point I started to make is anything that

23

is said by counsel at the podium here is not evidence.

24

be going over my notes and pointing out to you key things.

25

Mr. Nelson disagrees with what I'm saying, I'm sure he will
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1

And you may recall what Mr. Robles said.

He said

2

that the knife was -- it was a palm up, and he holds his hand

3

up this way.

4

up here.

5

nobody is saying someone is making huge motions, you know,

6

this.

7

but somewhere between -- at the closest five feet and possibly

8

somewhere around 20 feet.

9

There's a couple of other witnesses that have it

But they're

anJ there's a -- slight motions.

But
like

And, um, this is all occurring at some unknown distance,

So the

I'm going to go on to the other witnesses

10

as far as what their -- my recollection and my notes of

11

where -- what they had to say that I think is important, but

12

before I do that, I want to back up a little bit to what I

13

think is something important that you keep in mind that the

14

State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

15

Mr. Nelson has made a point about, well, the

16

defendant when he was at the hospital, which was five days

17

after he had this surgery, which they were preparing for,

18

was 12 days after -- or was three days after his surgery, which

19

was 12 and the surgery was 12 days after he was shot and he

20

wasn't, you know, in good enough shape to be interviewed three

21

days before this interview, but now that he's had the surgery,

22

and you can bring your common experience into the jury room.

23

You know, maybe there's no one 0n the jury that's ever had

24

major surgery, but you can bring your common sense, your common

25

experience in.

That's why we have jurors.

which

That's one of the
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1

beauties of the jury system.
But the defendant doesn 1 t have any obligation to come

2

3

forward.

And, you know, all of this investigation, all this

4

stuff is happening, all these pictures, all these -- they are

5

setting things up, they are doing all of this, they have the

6

whole -- West Valley Police Department is out there doing --

7

presenting -- you know, taking photographs and putting things,

8

bullet casings or shell casings into evidence bags and doing

9

all of this, and the defendant is in the hospital and it's

10

like, you know, they are just going to come and then say, Oh,

11

well, you just tell us what you want, and we'll -- you know if

12

it's some excuse then, you know, we're not going to charge you

13

with attempted aggravated murder.

14

made that they're -- they re -- that he's charged with

15

attempted aggravated murder.

16

he didn't come forward with al~ this evidence, his statement,

17

his explanation of how he got the knife, or his pants were

18

baggy, that he must be guilty.

19

system works.

20

You know, their decision was

1

And then it's like, oh, because

You know, that isn't how our

And, you know, there isn't -- did -- did Detective

21

Sanders ask him, you know, were your pants baggy?

22

Where did you get the knife?

23

questions weren't asked.

24
25

u0u know.

You know.

You know, these

So he's come forward -- this is his day in court.
This is his opportunity to tell you his side of the story, you
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1

know.

And then because he does that, it's some sort of penalty

2

that's supposed to apply.

3

or have some sort of lack of credibility?

~re you supposed to not believe him

Our system does not work that way.

4

And I want you to

5

hold the State to its burden.

If there is any reasonable doubt

6

in this case, you have to find the defendant not guilty.
Now just continue about these distances, pointing out

7
8

there are -- every witness had some different concept of the

9

witness.

I think the most favocable witness from the

10

standpoint of how this knife is being held was Mr. Robles.

You

11

know, because he 1 s sitting right in this -- you know, he 1 s just

12

showing the jury, his palm is extended upward.

13

it's not even -- he didn't even raise his hand up.

It's just --

And there's at least two other witnesses, and

14

15

possibly three, that talk abouL it's raised up.

16

one that talks about it's a slightly forward motion.

17

this.

18

looking at the distances and all the thing, and this is at

19

night and everything else, I don't know that that's so

20

inconsistent with what the defendant is saying.

21

know, he s raising his hand up ~nd he s showing this knife.

I don't know that that's -- you know,

Then there's
I t ' s like

when you are

That he

you

1

1

And if you're as far away as Officer Vincent said he

22
23

was, which was 15 to 16 feet,

I don't think that's -- you know,

24

that's necessarily evidence that you are attempting to kill

25

somebody.
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1

2

that.
And then the last thing,

the video recording that you

3

saw played in court,

4

saying that you have to, everything is 100 percent up to you,

5

if you would like to view the video, knock on the door,

6

Officer Snow or whichever bailiff is sitting outside know that

7

you want to view the video.

8

it however many times you want, and then he'll bring it all

9

back out again.

10

if you want to view the video, and I'm not

He'll bring the laptop, he'll play

Okay?

Officer Snow, come up and take the oath.

11

(Oath administered to the bailiff.}

12

THE COURT:

13

14

15

Okay.

Go ahead and be seated.

Benefit

of the record for any of you?

MR. NELSON:

Yes, your Honor.

Can I talk about the

issue of burden shifting for a moment here?

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NELSON:

18

let

Sure.
This is the sidebar conversation we had

during the State's first closing argument.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. NELSON:

Yes.
I want to make it really clear to the

21

Court that the allegation of b~rden shifting is something that

22

I personally take very seriously and something that I am

23

extremely concerned about especially after we've laid a

24

substantial record with other witnesses in this case about what

25

the defendant did or did not say when we had the opportunity to
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1

talk to police officers.

2

If we're not able to talk about and argue these

3

things in closing argument, we're basically stuck with whatever

4

the defendant decides to say in front of the jury.

5

witness credibility instruction and inferences that we're able

6

to legitimately draw from that, are things that I was arguing

7

on.

And the

And I just want to make sure I have the record for that.

8

THE COURT:

Mr. Shuey.

9

MR. SHUEY:

Well, maybe I'm missing something, but I

10

think the first time that the defendant was actually given an

11

opportunity, a realistic opportunity to say anything to the

12

police was on this second visit to the hospital.

13

if Mr. Nelson is talking about, you know, when he's on the way

14

to the hospital or the night

15

only -- we have Detective Sanders coming to interview him.

16

don't have any lengthy foundation of what questions were asked

17

the defendant, whether he was asked, you know, were your pants

18

baggy or what -- were all these other -- whatever points it was

19

that were made as far as why didn't you tell us this before.

20

OL

I don't know

the incident or what, but the
We

And I don't think the defendant has an obligation to

21

come forward with -- to the police and make some -- you know,

22

try to explain his innocence to the police.

23

the way the scenario in which this was -- came up was it had

24

the impact of shifting the burden.

25

And I think that

So, I understand -- and I'm -- you know, Mr. Nelson
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1

is the last person in the world I would ever -- you know,

2

hope that he's not thinking that I'm in any way accusing him of

3

intentionally doing anything improper.

4

he did was improper.

5

do anything improper.

6

I

I don't -- I think what

I don't think that he would intentionally

And maybe I'm wrong in my thinking about it,

but I

7

feel that the way this -- the way that it came up was he was

8

basically shifting the burden saying well the defendant

9

[inaudible] didn't -- had his opportunity to explain all this

10

to the police before and now he just tells us this the first

11

day of trial.

12

burden.

And I think that's an improper shifting of

MR. NELSON:

13

And, your Honor, my response to that is

14

that puts us in an incredibly difficult position.

15

that interview, the defendant attempts to invoke his Miranda

16

rights a couple of times and keeps talking to the officers.

17

The officers aren't asking him questions.

18

there listening to him for seven minutes, talk and talk and

19

talk and talk.

20

lawyer.

21

Because in

They were sitting

Even after he ~aid I think I ought to have a
~

So the -- I mean, we're trying to give him the

22

benefit of the doubt and not bring it out in front of the jury

23

that he's attempted to invoke Miranda, which is something that

24

I clearly understand would be incredibly unethical and not

25

appropriate for me to do.
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1

And, you know, to be accused of burden shifting at

2

that point when we're trying to protect his right to exercise

3

the right to counsel is something that I don't appreciate the

4

fact that we've been put in that position.
THE COURT:

5

Okay.

Thank you.

I made the ruling at

6

the time that the objection was made and the arguments were

7

made by counsel.

8

commenting or arguing the issue of what the defendant did or

9

did not say in the context of arguing that the defendant's

10

And I found at the time that the State was

testimony should not be considered credible.

11

I indicated at the time that the State -- I overruled

12

the objection finding that ~he State was simply arguing the

13

evidence that was already presented to the jury that had been

14

admitted.

15

My recollection was there was specific questions

16

asked about the injury and specific questions regarding did the

17

defendant say anything about the knife being -- having Native

18

American connections.

19

of those questions I believe were answered.

20

in.

21

Was ~here anything said about?

And all

The evidence came

It was un-objected to.
And the State was in my opinion, not shifting the

22

burden but plainly stating that this was the evidence that came

23

in.

24

consider the testimony of the defendant credible.

25

And that considering that evidence, the jury should not

That they were not arguing that somehow the defendant
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1

should have provided additional evidence or things of that

2

nature but that those -- that -- that the interview or

3

statements were not made, and that it was argument that was

4

relevant to -- well, again about evidence that was in and

5

relevant to the issues of witness credibility.

6

So the Court's ruling will stand.

7

Anything else you want to put on the record?

8

MR. NELSON:

9

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
So before you leave, two things.

No.

1,

10

if you'll hang out here for about a half an hour or so.

11

there's a question or an isJue regarding the video, I want both

12

of you here so that we can decide what it is and how we're

13

going to do the video.

If

And then secondly, I want to commend both counsel for

14
15

the professional way in which the jury was -- the trial was

16

conducted and your accessibility to the Court and to the

17

defendant and to all partie, involved in this case.

18

understand that it's hard enough to try cases, and I think both

19

of you have done a very professional job in that regard,

20

regardless of the outcome.

21

time.

22

MR. SHUEY:

Okay.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. NELSON:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

It -- I

So you can come back any

~

Even though we're not the same - So we I ll be in recess.

And then like I
@
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1

just kind of let your arm rest.

2

know how to explain it other than that it was in position where

3

it I s ready to go.

Like, it was in a -- I don't

So it I s in :!is waist area.

4

Q.

Can I have you stand up?

5

A.

Sure.

6

Q.

And I'm going to hand you my pen.

So ...

If the capped end

7

of that pen is the sharp end of the pen and the noncapped end

8

is the handle end of it, using your arm, can you show the way

9

the defendant was holding it w~en you first,

10

A.

So just like this.
MR. NELSON:

11

first saw that?

Your Honor, for the record, the

12

witness's hand -- arm is at a square.

13

hand is in front of him and the capped end of the pen is facing

14

forward.
THE COURT:

15.

16

Q.

His elbow is bent, his

Thank you.

So Officer Vincent, at this point has your thought

17

process about this situation changed or does it remain the same

18

since you were in the parking lot observing the defendant?

19

A.

No, it's changed.

At this point I got back on the

20

radio and I asked for dispatch to send me everybody.

21

him that the pedestrian tha~ I had stopped was armed.

I

told

22

Q.

What's personally going through your mind right now?

23

A.

Um,

lots of things.

It's -- I think people get into

24

law enforcement for various reasons.

For me it would be

25

difficult to hold a desk job because I have a short attention
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1

span.

And I enjoy serving people.
My thoughts immediat~ly shift towards my family.

2

3

I've got people that depend on me.

4

You know, you kind of go into a -- into a -- I don't

5

know,

for lack of a better term, a cop mode to where you're

6

professional and you try and be courteous.

7

out the window.
I

8
9

And all that went

Like it's just pure survival at that point.

don't think I gave ~nother radio transmission out

until the aftermath of what had occurred, but yeah, for me,

10

it's just a matter of making it home at the end of the night at

11

that point.

12

Q.

Did you continue to get out of the car?

13

A.

Yes,

So ...

I did.

I had a -- one foot out already.

And,

14

you know, based on training exPerience, you don't want to be

15

sitting in a vehicle.

16

I

17

pointed it at the defendant and I told him to drop the knife.

18

So ...

That's a bad spot to be.

I got out and

drew out my department issued firearm from its holster,

and I

19

Q.

Are you left or right-handed, Officer Vincent?

20

A.

Left-handed.

21

Q.

Did the defendant drop the knife when you told him

23

A.

No, he did not.

24

Q.

What did he do?

25

A.

He began to walk north of from where we were both

22

to.
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1

Go have lunch, and t' ·'.:!n you will come back, we will

2

give you copies and read the final instructions.

3

counsel's closing statements, and then I will tell you at that

4

time that you may be excused to deliberate.

5
6

You'll hear

Okay?

Thank you.

Does anybody need more than -- it's about five
minutes to 12.

Can you be back at one?

Please be seated.

7

One?

Okay, 1 o'clock.

All members of the jury have now

8

left the courtroom.

9

DVD and so forth and then let me know what you decide when we

10

Will you work amongst yourselves on the

come back?
And then if you'll also make sure all the exhibits

11
12

that have been received are here, those that have not been

13

removed so something doesn 1 c accidentally go to the jury.

14

can probably pile them up on the witness stand so that they are

15

easy access to you if you need to use them during your closing

16

arguments.

Then we'll see everybody back here at 1 o'clock.

17

We'll be in recess.

18

(Recess taken by the court.)

19

(Jury instructionJ read to the jury.)

20

THE COURT:

Counsel, closing arguments.

Mr. Nelson.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

21

22

You

BY MR. NELSON:

Mr. Fairbourn, counsel, your Honor, ladies and

23

24

gentlemen of the jury.

25

now.

We've been going for almost two days

We •ve heard a lot of ·vitnesses and seen a lot of
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1

You heard a little bit about how there was a shift in

2

position.

Mr. -- the defendant crossed the street.

Officer

3

Vincent crossed the street as well and went over to the Holiday

4

Oil Gas Station there.
You've heard Officer Vincent talk about how he

5

6

continued to observe the defendant for a short period of time

7

and then the defendant walks out into the street and turns

8

around and looks back at Officer Vincent.

9

that Officer Vincent pulls his vehicle out into the street.

It's at that point

10

And as he 1 s getting out of the car, before he's even able to

11

completely get out of the car, l~hat does he hear from the

12

defendant?

13

thing that he hears coming out of the defendant's mouth as he's

14

getting out of his car and attempting to look into the

15

situation a little bit further and have a passing [inaudible]

16

with the defendant.

You're going to fucking die.

That's the first

17

You okay, sir?

Okay

18

MR. NELSON:

19

Not only does the defendant tell Officer Vincent what

I didn't mean to do that.

20

his intentions are at that point, he pulls out and displays

21

this knife, State's Exhibit 31, which you'll have available to

22

you in the jury room, displays it forward towards Officer

23

Vincent and they are facing each other at that point.

24
25

Officer Vincent, I think you can see on the stand,
was emotional about this situation.

This is something that
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1

upset him.

2

say this caused him pause and caused him significant amount of

3

concerns.

4

heard Officer Vincent call out on the radio, testified when

5

first at one speed towards this area and then I sped up

6

completely after that because I could hear the stress in

7

Officer Vincent's voice.

I'm even prepared to

If you remember from Officer Fife as well, when he

Officer Vincent is somebody who Officer Fife

8
9

This is something that, urn,

testified he knows he's a pretty calm, collected guy and an

10

experienced police officer.

And I think you could see this

11

from Officer Vincent's testimony.

12

didn't present himself to you as someone who is high-strung.

13

He didn't present himself to you as somebody who would get

14

worked up about a situation that was really nothing without any

15

sort of pause or concern.

16

himself to you as a pretty cool cucumber, for lack of a better

17

word.

I mean, Officer Vincent

I think Officer Vincent presented

So at this point, Officer Vincent describes this sort

18
19

of tantamount acknowledgment between each other of the

20

defendant and Officer Vincent.

21

as far apart as the witness stand there and the witness -- and

22

the counsel podium here.

23

go back and forth a little bit.

24

he is concerned that the defendant might be trying to blade

25

him.

Either standing approximately

O~ficer Vincent described that he'd
Officer Vincent tells you that

And he described what blading means and how -- he used a
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1

football analogy.

And that the worst hits in football come

2

when they are not in your

3

side.

4

coming, you can prepare for that.

5

to you from the side, that's something that's especially

6

concerning and dangerous to Officer Vincent.

nut in your vision coming from the

If they are coming on srraight on, you can see i t

7

But if somebody has an angle

Officer Vincent says that at some point the defendant

8

changes the orientation of the knife he held in front of him

9

like this to turning the blade upside down and holding it abov~

10

his shoulder, around the area of his jaw.
Officer Vincent tells you that multiple times he's

11

12

telling the defendant, stop, drop it.

Officer Vincent is

13

trying to stop this situation, to deescalate what's going on.

14

But that's not what happens.

Okay.

The defendant eve .. 1tually takes a step towards Officer

15
16

Vincent.

17

another step towards Officer Vincent with his hand once again

18

above his shoulder around his chin area and that's when Officer

19

Vincent fires what we now know because of the investigation

20

through West Valley Police Department with three rounds that

21

struck the defendant and enied the situation when the defendant

22

fell down.

23

Officer Vincent gets stopped.

The defendant takes

Okay?
At this point when Officer Vincent testifies to you

24

is that he goes from a feeling of I'm going to die to what am I

25

going to do to save this person.

He gets on the radio.
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1

I@

2

CLOSING ARGUMENT

BY MR. NELSON:
Ladies and gentlemen,

3

I think it's clear that defense

4

counsel is upset and very worked up about the way that the

5

police department chose to handle this situation that night.

6

Okay?

And he is upset about t!te fact that the defendant was

7

shot.

I think that's very clear.
And he's using language with you to the effect of

8
9

10

Officer Vincent shot,

I think he called him this poor young

man.
I want to direct you1 attention just quickly to

11

12

Instruction No.

13

of jury duties.

14

that you may feel towards one side or the other influence your

15

decision in any way."

11 and jury du~y.

It's the very last paragraph

"Do not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice

Okay?

I'm asking you to -- however bad you may feel

16
17

Officer Vincent or the defendaPt in this case, set those

18

feelings aside and decide tnis case on the facts,

19

feelings.

20

for

not on those

Okay?
And frankly,

it's an easy thing,

I suppose,

to stand

21

up here and to put yourself in the position of police officers

22

who are out on a crime scene in the middle of the night where a

23

knife is involved and to question the policies and procedures

24

that they do to make themse~ves safe, but it's frankly a

25

more difficult to be in that situation yourself.
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1

actions but, you know,

I didn't -- I don't feel I did anything

2

that I deserved to get shot or -- yeah.
Q.

You don't feel like you deserved what happened to

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

And it's because you were -- told the jury at least

3
4

7
8

9

you?

you were trying to surrender, right?
A.

Yes,

cooperate.

I was trying to surrender, come back and

But I think at that time the officer was,

you know,

10

maybe -- I don't know.

He seemed like he had a lot of

11

adrenaline.

12

was advancing with the firearm.

13

were at a distance at that point maybe 20, 25 feet, and I had

14

taken like two steps and the next that thing I know, you know,

15

I heard a boom.

16

then I just, you know, blacked out.

And as I turned back,

I noticed that,

And, you know,

you know, he

it was

we

And then I just -- I was on the ground and

~

17

~

Q.

Mr. Fairbourn, you w~re here present yesterday when

I'm talking

18

those other five witnesses besides Officer Vincent,

19

about Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson, Mr. Wiersma, Mr. Velasquez and

20

Mr. Robles, you were here yesterday when they told the jury

21

they saw you lunging at the officer, right?

I was here.

22

A.

Yes,

23

Q.

And they -- you hear~ them when they told

24
25

MR. SHUEY:

Your Honor,

I object to that.

That

wasn't the testimony of all of those witnesses.
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1
2

THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

The jury

will determine what the facts ~re based on what they heard.
Q.

3

And you heard these witnesses when they told the jury

4

that they saw you holding something, some of them said a knife

5

but some said holding their hand out in front of you as you are

6

facing the officer, right?

7

A.

Yes, I heard that.

8

Q.

And did you hear Mr. Wiersma when he told the jury

9

10

that you were holding the kJife over your head, lunging and
making a motion like that towards the officer?

11

A.

Yes, I heard him.

12

Q.

So if you were trying to submit or surrender to the

13

officer and these witnesses are perceiving something else,

14

it your testimony today that this is just a misunderstanding on

15

their part?

16

A.

No.

is

You know, when something happens and everyone

17

has different perspectives or advantage points, you know,

18

not always, you know, perceived as the other person perceives

19

it.

20

you know,

21

see my hands.

And um,

22

or something.

And then right after, you know,

23

seconds, it was -- you know, gunshots just went off and --

24

yeah.

25

And when I had the knife out,

Q.

I

was like, you know,

it's

hey,

I've got a knife, you know, because you told me to
I think he said like drop to the ground

in a matter of

So I'm going to point at Detective Sanders right
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Q.

1
2

in time did he make it, just so that we're all clear?
A.

3

4

And this statement the defendant made, exactly when

Uh, as -- it was simultaneous with the -- when he

produced the knife.
Q.

5

So ...

Officer Vincent, as you are walking back and forth

6

with the defendant, approximately how much space is between you

7

and him?

8

A.

I would say from me to you.

9

Q.

And you're sitting at the witness stand and I'm

10

So ...

standing at the witness podium?

11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

Is there anything about the distance between you and

13

the defendant that caused you concern at this point?
A.

14

15

program.

There is.

They teach you a rule with edged weapons -MR. SHUEY:

16

So I went through a federal training

Your Honor, I would object to what he was

17

trained, what might have be~n taught to him at some other

18

program.
Can I ask you both to approach.

19

THE COURT:

20

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

21

THE COURT:

State your objection.

22

MR. SHUEY:

I'm sorry.

23

THE COURT:

State your objection and then Mr. Nelson

MR. SHUEY:

Okay.

24

25

can.
Well, I object to what he might
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1

have said at some training class.

2

THE COURT:

Because?

3

MR. SHUEY:

I -- I don't think that it's -- I

4

think

5

case.

his state of mind ~snot relevant, you know,

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. NELSON:

don't

to this

Mr. Nelson.

I think it's absolutely relevant that

8

we're right in the middle of an attack here that we're terming

9

yes, an attempt to kill the victim and not just attempt to

10

assault him or do anything ~lse.
Frankly, bad enough obviously to the point where he

11

12

pulled his gun and shot it.
THE COURT:

13

Unless you are going to get into any

14

cross-examination -- I mean, what you've already gotten into,

15

you've already gotten into what the officers did from the other

16

witnesses.

17

crime, any testimony or cross-examination, whatever they --

18

regarding that officers reacted, would open the door as to why

19

they reacted that way, why he reacted that way, right?

20

21
22

And I suppose if we stick to the element of the

MR. SHUEY:

So I still don't see how it's relevant.

I think the defendant's state of mind is what's relevant.
THE COURT:

I understand that, but I -- so maybe I

23

misstated the objection as to ~1at you indicated and that is

24

the question to why he reacted a certain way.

25

the door on cross regarding his conduct and what he -- his

But if you open
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1

reaction

2

MR. SHUEY:

3

MR. NELSON:

Okay.

All right.

Then it would open it.

And my Lesponse to that is that the

4

defendant's actions are causing an effect on this witness here.

5

And his perception of what's going on is certainly relevant to

6

how he's feeling about the situation.

7

THE COURT:

Is your objection [inaudible]

8

MR. SHUEY:

It's relevance, and I don't think his

9

state of mind or how he's feel~ng has anything to do with it.

10
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

So I just want to make clear, your

objection is relevance?

12

MR. SHUEY:

Yes.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

For now I'm going to sustain the

14

objection regarding any trainir.9 that he had.

15

is opened on cross, you cross on the officer's reaction,

16

the door is opened.
MR. SHUEY:

17
18

Q.

Okay.

(BY MR. NELSON)

But if the door
then

I understand.

Okay.

Officer Vincent, taking you

19

now to the point where you are at the end of this 30 seconds of

20

going back and forth, you are ~pproximately as far apart as you

21

are and I are, did that discance between you and the defendant

22

ever close?

23

A.

Did it become closer?

Yes, it did.

There came a point where we stopped

24

parallelling each other.

The whole time we're facing each

25

other, the defendant stopped walking.

I would stop walking.
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1

2
3

A.

Urn, he probably walked from where he's seated now to

where I am.
Q.

Okay.

If I could have just a second.

If I could

4

have just one second, your Honor, well, a little more than a

5

second.

6

That's all .r have.

7

THE COURT:

8

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

9

THE COURT:

Can I ask counsel to approach, please.

So let me just [inaudible] objections

10

made as far as [inaudible].

11

should -- I guess I didn't articulate it.

12

about it, the more I think I may be in error [inaudible] .

13

There's been testimony regarding the distance between the

14

officer and the defendant during various times that the

15

questions were asked.

16

17
18

MR. SHUEY:

I reacted --

[inaudible] maybe I
The more I think

That's very relevant to whether he's

making -- the defendant is making [inaudible]
THE COURT:

So -- and that's -- but I anticipate

19

testimony of the officer regar..:.ing the training class that

20

should the defendant, because he was in some training

21

[inaudible] that threat is a threat when there's a particular

22

distance between

23

MR. SHUEY:

I'm assuming that's where it's going.

24

THE COURT:

That's not in evidence.

25

So that's where

I think my ruling was in error 0ecause [inaudible] your
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1

argument is going to be [inaudible] that the distance where he

2

had a knife or knife [inaudible] and so that makes my ruling

3

for the State [inaudible] the officer reacted the way he did,

4

why he felt the knife was a threat,

5

that's the case, then it is relevant.
So again,

6

I

the distance.

say that because I

And if

thought maybe I

7

assumed wrong as to what the officer is going to testify.

8

you proffer what he was going to say?
MR. NELSON:

9

Will

Yes, he's going to say that he was

10

troubled and concerned about the situation because he knows

11

that anytime something is less than 20 feet away from you,

12

they can get to you more quickly than you can stop them from

13

getting to you just because that distance is so close.

that

14

THE COURT:

So if that's the case --

15

MR. SHUEY:

I would object that he doesn't know that.

16

He doesn't know that.

17

it's relevant, but I still -- but I think there's a difference

18

between

19
20

21

MR. NELSON:

Maybe he was told that.

I don't think

Well, whether or not it's actually true

is one thing, but that's why he's nervous about it.
THE COURT:

And frankly,

I think -- again,

the

22

testimony thus far has brought the issue up,

the distance of

23

whether was he threatened, so torth.

24

guess his reaction, which agai~ I'm sure there's going to be --

25

anyway I wanted to chat with you before --

And his reaction,
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1

MR. SHUEY:

Let me just make -- so far,

as far as I'm

2

concerned,

3

or not there's actually an intent to commit a murder.

4

think that's very relevant Zor them,

5

the whole trial is about.

6

of mind and all that,

7

for me on other things.

THE COURT:

8

9

the testimony about distances has to do with whether
And I

that issue, which is what

So if this is admitted for his state

then I think it also opens up the door

Such as?

Listen,

if the State wants to

open that door and you think there's something else that you
then that's fine.

But I wanted to talk about it

10

can get in,

11

again beca~se again there's been testimony [inaudible]

12

regarding the distance and I'm assuming that that was brought

13

in [inaudible) whether or not what the defendant did was a

14

threat to be a certain distance,

15

and so forth.

16

question was but I'm assuming the question [inaudible]

17

officer

the knife the way it was at

So the question is, again I don't know what the
the

18

MR. SHUEY:

Whether he received some training on

19

THE COURT:

Well,

20

MR. NELSON:

I think he was going to say

I didn't ask him if he received

just asked him if there's something about the

21

training.

22

distance between the two of them.

23

24

25

I

MR. SHUEY:

He started to say -- his hands were

starting to say federal training.

MR. NELSON:

That's why he was nervous.
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1

2

THE COURT:

[inaudible]

they were told that they can

get to you quicker than you car. draw your gun.

3

MR. NELSON:

4

THE COURT:

And I

6

MR. SHUEY:

I want it stricken for cause.

7

THE COURT:

But I was assuming that's what he was

5

That's P.ssentially what he -say that because I can't

remember

8

going to say, which I think based on the testimony regarding

9

distances

10

[inaudible].
MR. NELSON:

And so [inaudible]
Yes.

And I would like to do that,

11

wonder if it might make sense to excuse the jury for a

12

of minutes and have us talk about this in front Officer

13

Vincent.

14

I'm a little nervous about that.

We've come so far,

but I

couple

I don't want to have a mistrial.

Okay.

15

THE COURT:

16

Members of the jury, we're going to give you about a

17

five-minute break so that we can address an issue that we need

18

to on the record.

19

counsel have stated that we will be completed with the

20

testimony for today five at the latest and maybe even before.

21

And then plan on coming back tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock for

22

the rest of the case.

23

done in two days.

24

25

And I'm -- my best estimate is based on what

And it looks like we most likely will be

Again, having said that, something may change
tomorrow but that's our best guess at this point.

Again, do
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1

not talk about the case or anything.

2

for five minutes and then we 1 l

3

Okay?

1

We're going to excuse you

have you come right back.

4

Okay.

Please be seated.

5

All members of the jury have now left the courtroom.

6

I had a conversation with counsel at sidebar that is

7

on the record.

I will not restate that, but counsel had a good

8

suggestion that we should excuse the jury and kind of go over

9

the question and the answer that Mr. Nelson you asked during

10

direct e~amination of Officer Vincent to see if there is

11

anything that we need to explore further outside of the jury's

12

presence before I allowed you to do that on redirect.
MR. NELSON:

13
14

this --

~

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NELSON:

17

So can I just make a brief proffer about

Yes.
-- and so that Officer Vincent doesn't

necessarily have to testify?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NELSON:

Okay.
So the question was something to the

20

effect of, as you and the d~fendant are approximately 10 feet

21

away from each other and shifting back and forth and you are

22

matching his movements, I asked you is there anything about the

23

distance between the two of you that's causing you concern at

24

this point.

25

And Officer Vincent began to describe a training that
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1

he had attended.

2

that if somebody is within approximately 20 feet of you,

3

a distance that somebody else can close before you are able to

4

stop them with your firearm.

5

And at that ~raining officers are trained
that's

And so any time a person is less than that distance

6

away from you, that is an indication, a clue to you that you

7

need to be especially careful at that point.
Is that a fair way to describe what your proposed

8

9

testimony would be?

10

THE WITNESS:

Outside of the world of just the

11

general public, any officer that goes through any academy in my

12

opinion, I know for a fact within the state of Utah, they teach

13

you what they call 21-foot ~ule.

14

reacting to an action that's already in progress, that anything

15

within that 21 feet is a kill zone.

16

And it's that if you are

So I guess the point being that I were well within

17

that range and that they've done studies on a, you know,

18

facsimile type weapons and they've had individuals that aren't

19

quick enough to get a shot 0ff when they are being advanced on

20

with a fixed advanced weapon.
MR. NELSON:

21

That's all.

So ...

So that would be what the answer to that

22

question would be essentially.

23

MR. SHUEY:

And your Honor, our -- I object to the

the whole answer as relevant, which is going to his

24

whole

25

state of mind rather than the defendant's.
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1

But if it's admissible,

if the Court rules i t ' s

2

admissible,

3

was and not in terms of any officer or they've done studies or

4

I don't know what studies -- I'd like -- you know, if a study

5

is going to be cited, I want to know what the study is and have

6

my own expert, you know, assess it.

7

I think it should be limited to what his training

So if the Court allows this line of questioning,

8

would hope that it would only be allowed as to what Officer

9

Vincent has himself been instructed, not what studies have

10

shown or what any other officer or other officers have been

11

instructed or anyone in the state of Utah would have been

12

instructed if they were a p~ace officer.

I

But if he is testifying that he was instructed that

13
14

within 21 feet there's a danger zone or something of that

15

nature; although again, I object to the whole relevancy of it.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NELSON:

Okay.

Anything further?

We don't need to talk about studies.

18

That's not - - he's not test ~.fying he's an expert.

19

saying he's a part of the studies or that he conducted the

20

studies.

21

part of this.

22

He's not

That doesn't -- there's no reason that needs to be

And, you know, since we're talking about this in

23

Officer Vincent's presence, I think we can tell, um, if you are

24

asked this question, don't talk about studies that have been

25

completed or, you know, your knowledge or lack of knowledge on
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1

who's a participant who

2

THE WITNESS:

No, that's fine.

If you were to ask me

3

in front of a jury,

4

of when I went through the academy, they taught me that

5

anything less than 21, 21 feet or less is a,

6

So ...

MR. SHUEY:

7

8

I would try to give an answer to the effect

is a kill zone.

That would take care of my other

objections, you know, as far as -THE COURT:

9

Okay.

I'm going to allow the testimony

10

as has been articulated.

The auestion was, what about the

11

distance caused you concern, or something to that effect.

12

There's been a lot made about the distance on every one of the

13

eyewitnesses.

14

they at that point?

15

allegedly pulled the knife?

16

Officer Vincent shot the defendant three times?

How far were they at this point?

How far were

How far were they apart when the defendant
How far were they apart when

And so a question to this witness about what was

17

18

concerning to him, which may explain why he reacted a

19

particular way,

20

already been raised regarding the distance between the

21

witnesses and whether or not the defendant's actions were a

22

threat,

23

is relevant because of the issues that have

right?
The defendant's a~tions and whether or not they are a

24

threat are not just the fact that he pulled the knife,

25

the distance between them and what was occurring.

So it's,
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1

it's a totality of the circumstances surrounding what was

2

occurring at the time, which certainly includes the distance

3

between the parties and so forth.
MR. SHUEY:

4

Well, your Honor, then I object not only

5

on relevance as far as his -- you know, what Officer Vincent's

6

state of mind was, but if this training -- if this 21-foot rule

7

becomes -- is -- constitutes a threat if you are within

8

21 feet,

9

testimony.

then I don't -- I think that's in the nature of expert

THE COURT:

10

No, no, no.

I'm saying he can't say all

11

officers are trained in this regard.

12

was trained on in POST, right?

13

MR. NELSON:

14

That was

It's not expert testimony.

He's just

talking about

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NELSON:

17

He can say that's what he

~

Yeah, what he's
-- what it was that made him nervous
~

about that.
THE COURT:

18

Yeah, because the question was, what

19

about the distance caused you concern or something to that

20

effect.

21

officers.

22

So it's referring to him and not generally to

So I will allow the question to be asked or questions

23

to be asked in that regard.

A... j Officer Vincent has been

24

present the entire time.

25

training and his concerns and so forth under the circumstances.

He may answer regarding his own
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MR.

1

\ii

vi

~

I'm sorry to be repetitive but

just to be sure, my objection on relevance is that his state of

3

mind, whether he felt threatened,

4

offense and it's not - - it's not relevant.
THE COURT:

5

is not an element of the

Well, I 1 m not bringing

I'm not

6

allowing it in to show what he necessarily felt but whether or

7

not the circumstances given the distance and the threat by

8

your - - the alleged threat by your client with the knife and

9

the distance and his advancement towards him and so forth

10

constituted a threat.

11

witness -- or the jurors back.
MR. NELSON:

And so -- okay.

Let's bring the

And, your Honor, Mr. Venerable is here.

13

I wonder if we might just take a minute for him just as a

14

courtesy to him and get him out of here.
(Another matter was heard.)

15

MR. NELSON:

16
17

V/!J/jl

And again,

2

12

(.J\

SHUEY:

So woul~ this be, like, a redirect

question that I'm asking him?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NELSON:

20

MR. SHUEY:

Yes.
Are you finished with your cross,

Ray?

Well, I was because I was holding off

21

on -- I didn't ask a question because I didn't want to open the

22

door.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's fine.

24

MR. SHUEY:

I did have just one more question to ask.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

Sure.

Sure.

Come on up.
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1

MR. SHUEY:

Come on up.

2

THE COURT:

As so.Jn as the jury is here, you can ask

3

your questions and then Mr. Nelson can redirect.
Thank you.

4

5

courtroom.

6

previously been sworn.

7
8

Q.

All members of the jury are now in the

And Officer Vincent resumes the stand.

Okay.

He's

Mr. Shuey.

Officer Vincent, you remember testifying at

the preliminary hearing in ~ay of this year?

I do.

9

A.

Yes,

10

Q.

All right.

And do you remember testifying that at

11

the time that you shot the defendant, he was maybe 16 feet,

12

15 feet?

13

A.

I'm -- I believe that that's accurate, yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

15
16

That would be the distance between you and the

defendant when you shot him?
A.

Correct.

17

MR. SHUEY:

That's all I have.

18

THE COURT:

Redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20

21

BY MR. NELSON:
Q.

Officer Vincent, I waat to take you back to the point

22

where you and him are approximately as far apart as you and me,

23

you and the defendant, and you are pacing back and forth with

24

each other.

25

two of you at that point that caused you concern?

Is there anything about the distance between the
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A.

1

When I went through POST, which is a peace officer's

2

standards and training,

they instructed me that anything within

3

21 feet is a kill zone.

Before somebody could get a shot off,

4

they could actually get stabbed within that distance.

5
6

MR. NELSON:

Thank you.

So ...

That's all the questions I

have, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Any r~cross?

8

MR. SHUEY:

No, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Any objection if the witness is excused?

10

MR. NELSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

14

No, no objection.
Thank you, sir, you may leave.
You're welcome.
Couns~l, could you approach one more

time?

15

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NELSON:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NELSON:

Do you have other witnesses?

I can do one more.
Okay.
Yeah,

You think we'll be done by five?

I was going to run through the

20

stuff with the scene with the clothes and the knife and stuff

21

like that.

22

it for me.

So some of that stuff is locked up [inaudible] get

23

THE COURT:

24

Okay.

25

MR. NELSON:

Okay.

Will the State call their next witness.
Yes, that will be Wade Sanders,

your
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